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Abstract 
Versions and extensions of intuitionistic and modal logic involving biHeyting and 
bimodal operators, the axiom of constant domains and Barcan’s formula, are formulated 
as structured categories. Representation theorems for the resulting concepts are proved. 
Essentially stronger versions, requiring new methods of proof, of known completeness theorems 
are consequences. A new type of completeness result, with a topos theoretic character, is given 
for theories satisfying a condition considered by Lawvere (1992). The completeness theorems 
are used to conclude results asserting that certain logics are conservatively interpretable in 
others. 
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1. Introduction 
The great insight of F.W. Lawvere’s that has created categorical ogic was to 
observe that “all” the significant logical operations arise as adjoints to naturally given 
functors. For example, binary products in a category C are given as the right adjoint 
to the diagonal functor C -+ C x C; and further, for any fixed A E C, exponentiation 
( )A is given as the right adjoint to A x ( ) : C + C. The pair of examples mentioned 
shows that the process of creating new operations is hierarchical (exponentiation 
relies on product), and that the functors to which we seek adjoints may be defined by 
parameters (in our case, the object A). The last sentence contains the more essential 
half of the idea of a categorical doctrine for logic. The specification of any categorical 
doctrine contains a choice of certain specific “adjoint operations”; these come in an 
ordered sequence so that each operation is defined in terms of the earlier ones as the 
adjoint to a specific functor explicitly definable, possibly with parameters, in terms of 
the earlier operations. The other half of the specification is the requirement hat 
certain “exactness properties” involving the operations should universally hold. 
Incidentally, the sense of “doctrine” here is essentially disjoint from that of 
“hyper-doctrine” (sometimes also abbreviated to “doctrine”). Both uses originate with 
Lawvere, the first in [20]. The concept of doctrine in categorical ogic in the sense 
indicated here is discussed in [18] entitled “Doctrines in categorical ogic”. 
The appeal of Lawvere’s approach is the generation, via the general abstract 
principle of adjunction, of the logical operations from the mere notions of abstract set, 
function and functional composition. It is to be emphasized that each adjoint is 
essentially uniquely determined by being an adjoint to a definite functor; the require- 
ment inherent in the specification of the doctrine is that the adjoint should exist. 
Moreover, the existence of any particular adjoint functor is a local condition; for any 
one object of the domain of the desired adjoint, an object with a certain universal 
(extremal) property in the codomain category is required to exist. 
There is no more convincing argument for the fundamentally objective nature of 
logic than Lawvere’s way of introducing its operations. 
The point left vague in the above description is the starting point for building 
up the operations. Usually, an object of a doctrine is based on a category C; the 
“first-level” operations are adjoints to functors of the form CH -+ Cc, induced 
from a map G -+ H of finite graphs, etc. In this case, the doctrine itself as a category, 
with morphisms the functors preserving the operations, has a forgetful functor to 
CAT, the category of categories; we say the doctrine is based on CAT. In this paper, 
we would like to advocate the adoption and study of doctrines that are based not 
on single categories, but on structures on the next level of complexity, namely a pair of 
categories connected with a functor. In this case, the doctrine has a forgetful functor 
to CAT’, the category of functors. For example, our proposal for a categorical 
formulation of Lewis’s S4 predicate logic is a doctrine based on CAT’. There will 
also be doctrines with objects based on three categories, with two connecting 
functors. 
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Usually, even before a particular doctrine has been specified, we have an idea of 
certain standard objects of it. For example, we may start with Set, the category of 
small sets, single out the operations of finite limits and finite coproducts (to give one 
specific choice of many possible ones), and ask for the doctrine that has all categories 
having the operations mentioned, and “having all the exactness properties pos- 
sessed by Set with respect o the operations singled out”. In the particular case, we 
obtain the doctrine of distributive categories. The point is that something very 
compact suffices to nail down the exactness properties: the finite coproducts have to 
be finite disjoint sums stable under pullback. The reason why we know that this 
specification answers the desideratum in quotes is a representation theorem: every 
small distributive category has a conservative operation-preserving functor into SetI, 
a Cartesian power of Set. By the nature of exactness properties, each such is inherited 
by the domain of a conservative operation-preserving functor from the codomain, 
much as a subalgebra inherits all identities (and all universal Horn properties) from 
the algebra it is a subalgebra of. Likewise, exactness properties are inherited by 
(Cartesian) products. 
The example described shows how the inquiry into the logical properties of a single 
category, or possibly of a class of categories, can give rise to a doctrine. Fixing Set as 
our category of interest does not by itself define the doctrine; we have to single out the 
adjoint operations of interest on Set. In fact, there are a number of doctrines all 
centered on Set; in each of them, the corresponding representation theorem expresses 
the central position of Set. 
What we outlined above is the categorical framework for completeness theorems in 
logic. Let us hasten to add that this is not a universally applicable framework; it is in 
fact quite selective, but also, quite widely applicable. H.J. Keisler’s completeness 
theorem on the quantifier “there exist uncountably many” does not fit the framework; 
the mentioned quantifier does not arise as an adjoint operation. On the other hand, 
classical ogic, and important fragments of it that without category theory would not 
be noticed so easily, various infinitary logics, higher-order logic, non-classical logics 
such as intuitionistic and modal logics, do fit the framework. Categorical ogic is not 
to be restricted to the categorical doctrines as given here; there are operations in 
categories that are fundamental after all and that do not arise as adjoint operations. 
However, it remains the case that the categorical doctrines in the specific sense 
described here form an interestingly distinctive field of study. 
The idea that interesting versions of modal logic are obtained by natural choices of 
categorical structures with respect o which the version can be proved to be complete 
is due to Ghilardi and Meloni [S, 93 and independently, to the second author [35] and 
Lavendhomme, Lucas and the second author [19]. However, in the papers mentioned 
our doctrinal frameworks are not developed. 
For early discussions of the idea of a categorical doctrine for logic, see [20, 183. 
In this paper, we establish doctrinal frameworks for several completeness theorems 
for strengthened versions of intuitionistic and modal logic. It is basic to our approach 
that the doctrines arise from natural “standard” objects. For instance, the doctrine S4 
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arises from considering the objects of the form z* : SetK + SetlK1, with K any category, 
and z : IKJ *K the “identity” map from the discrete category on the objects of K to 
K itself. Selecting for study the coherent operations (see below) in both domain and 
codomain, as well as the right adjoints to the induced maps S(X) + S(z*X), with 
X any object in the domain (S(Y) the lattice of subobjects of Y), we get OUI version of 
S4 predicate logic with equality. 
When compared with the traditional version of the same logic, ours turns out to be 
a proper extension; every S4 theory in the usual sense sits, via a “Lindenbaum-Tarski 
category”, in our doctrine, but not every object of the doctrine corresponds to such 
a theory. For one thing, our “theories” are many sorted. More importantly, in our 
“theories”, the necessity operator is applicable only to predicates whose free variables 
are of certain distinguished sorts; the classical setup does not envisage such a distinc- 
tion among sorts. 
The representation theorem for the S4 doctrine, already enunciated by specifying 
what we take the standard objects to be, thus turns out to be an extension of the 
classical Kripke completeness theorem. The situation with S4 just described repeats 
itself in broad outline involving other known logics and new doctrines. 
From the conceptual point of view, the central section of the paper is Section 4. 
Here, we clarify the close connection between, on the one hand, the invariance under 
substitution of coimplication and the past-possibility operator, duals of Heyting 
implication and (S4) necessity, and on the other hand, the axiom of constant domains 
and Barcan’s formula. Our doctrinal framework is especially revealing in this respect; 
in fact, the technically simple discussion of these topics in the doctrinal framework is, 
in our minds, the main contribution of this paper. The substitutivity of the necessity 
operator is a consequence of the definition of the S4 doctrine, which definition does 
not have any other elements than a basic requirement hat the categories and the 
functor involved be coherent, and the definition of necessity as an adjoint; no other 
exactness condition is explicitly required. The requirement of the connecting functor 
being conservative makes the domain-category of the S4 category Heyting, and 
defines implication in the well-known manner. This gives rise to the possibility (in the 
form of a left adjoint to the forgetful functor from S4 categories to Heyting categories) 
of a “free” interpretation of intuitionistic logic in S4 logic; the fact that this is 
a conservative interpretation is our version of the Godel interpretation of intuitionis- 
tic logic in S4 modal (predicate) logic. Further, because of the fact that the coimplica- 
tion is generated by the past-possibility operation in a similar manner as implication 
by necessity, there is an immediate connection between the (non-automatic) substitu- 
tivity of coimplication, and that of past-possibility. Adding to this the fact that the 
substitutivity of the past-possibility is in a natural connection with Barcan’s formula, 
we have outlined the main concerns of the paper. Our main results, proved in Sections 
6 and 8, are all answers to questions immediately arising out of this situation. For 
example, intuitionistic logic with selected sorts demanded to satisfy the axioms of 
constant domains, has a conservative free interpretation in modal logic with the same 
domains satisfying Barcan’s formula, and even more strongly, in bi-modal logic in 
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which the past-possibility operator is substitutive with respect to selected substitu- 
tions. 
Several of these facts have familiar versions in the literature. However, categorical 
logic gives a framework in which they appear in a conceptually satisfying manner. 
Also, as we point out below, our specific results are stronger than the corresponding 
classical results (when such corresponding results exist), and they require new 
methods with respect o those usually employed in the context of non-classical logics. 
In Section 6, we give Kripke-type completeness results both for intuitionistic and 
modal logic, with and without the additional operations of coHeyting implication and 
the “past-necessity” operator, in the context of the axiom of constant domains and 
Barcan’s formula. In contrast to the literature, our concepts provide a single context 
for the situations with or without the constant-domains axiom (resp. Barcan’s for- 
mula), by allowing a parameter we called B, the set of constant sorts. The classical 
contexts are the two extremes when B is empty (the additional axioms are not present), 
and when B is the set of all sorts (the axioms are required for all sorts; in fact, in the 
literature, only one sort is considered, but the many sorted case, with all of them 
constant, is a mathematically inessential generalization of the classical case). 
Allowing arbitrary B’s is natural in the categorical context. From the work in 
Section 6, in the brief Section 7 we obtain an axiomatization of the “logic of constant 
sets among variable sets”, in the form of a very natural categorical doctrine. 
Also, allowing arbitrary B’s results in an essential generalization, in the sense that 
the known methods are not sufficient o deal with the general case. In Section 6, we use 
the so-called special (derived from saturated) models from model theory; see [4]. In 
Section 5, we review the definitions in the context of many-sorted logic (that requires 
no essential change with respect o the usual setting), and prove a result, to be used in 
Section 6, that is of a familiar kind in model theory; it is a version of a preservation 
theorem, expressed in terms of the existence of mappings of a certain kind between 
special models. 
For the completeness theorems of Section 6 in their full generality, specifically for 
possibly uncountable theories, we do not know of any other method of proof, except 
in the extreme cases of the pure intuitionistic and the pure S4 doctrines, without 
constant sorts and without coimplication and without past-necessity. Ghilardi [7] has 
also used special models in modal logic. His results are quite different from ours, but 
the mathematics in Section 6 is related to Ghilardi’s. Our work was independent of 
Ghilardi’s. 
In the last section, which is in the way of an appendix, we present alternative 
methods, notably omitting types and other Henkin-type arguments for Kripke-type 
completeness results. These methods give slightly different specific results; they apply 
only in the case of countable theories, but in that case, they allow the use of “all” 
countable models, without saturation conditions. We reproduce a surprising 
Henkin-type argument due to Ghilardi and Meloni [8] that works in our more 
general context too. If one is only interested in the arithmetical (syntactical) conse- 
quences of the various completeness theorems (e.g., the conservative enrichment 
30 M. Ma&i, G.E. Reyes 1 Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 72 (I 995) 25- IO1 
results (see below)), there is no loss in restricting oneself to countable theories; this is 
a good reason why in the literature on non-classical ogics there is practically no 
mention of uncountable theories. There is still one case, notably bi-intuitionistic logic, 
for which we have not been able to prove the requisite completeness theorem even in 
the countable case without the use of some saturativity condition on models. 
Section 9 is a suitable context to compare the usual methods used in Kripke-type 
completeness proofs with or without constant domains, which are all Henkin-type 
arguments, with the Henkin-type arguments used for our doctrines. Rather than the 
fact of having several sorts instead of just one, the essential new element in our 
doctrines is the classification of sorts into two classes as indicated above in the case of 
the S4 doctrine, or in the case of modal and intuitionistic logic having certain domains 
constant, and others not. The reader will be able to compare the new methods 
required when constant sorts are mixed with non-constant ones (e.g., omitting types), 
with the “classical” methods in the non-mixed case; the latter will be reproduced in 
outline. 
The mixing of kinds of sorts is a new element in this work also with respect o recent 
work such as [9,19], and it is the result of our specific choice of the categorical 
doctrines for the various logics. In [19], there is no attempt at defining doctrines, 
although the standard structures of several of our doctrines do appear in that paper. 
The completeness theorems dealt with in Cl93 are for theories formulated in the 
symbolic-logical framework, with target categories the structures just referred to. In 
[9], there are hyper-doctrine-type doctrines that, in essence, are close to usual 
symbolic-logical theories. 
Section 8 gives completeness results that use Grothendieck toposes more general 
than presheaf toposes. From our point of view, the use of presheaf toposes as target 
categories for representation theorems is essentially the same as Kripke’s semantics, 
although [6] successfully makes the point that the use of general presheaf toposes 
gives results that cannot be achieved by using only presheaves over preorders, which, 
strictly speaking, is the original context for Kripke’s semantics. We were pleased to 
find that our earlier work in [29,26], originally motivated by independent consider- 
ations, was instrumental in arriving at the results in Section 8. 
We systematically use the idea of conservative enrichment to isolate proof-theoret- 
ical consequences of the representation theorems, showing that the latter have 
arithmetical (syntactical, proof-theoretical) content. We say that one doctrine is 
a conservative nrichment of another, if there is a “forgetful” functor from the first to 
the second whose left adjoint has a unit with conservative components. This general 
categorical concept encompasses Godel’s interpretation of intuitionistic logic in S4 
modal logic, and the several analogs of this result that are the main subject of this 
paper. The conservative nrichment results will be immediate consequences ofcorres- 
ponding completeness (representation) theorems. We are not aware of a clear state- 
ment in the literature of this state of affairs; that is, e.g., of the fact that the 
conservativeness of Godel’s interpretation is a corollary to Kripke’s completeness 
theorem for intuitionistic logic. However, as the referee has pointed out, the use of 
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semantic arguments in showing conservativeness is “folklore” in non-classical logic. In 
the preface of [17], we read “we prefer . . . to develop the semantics of intuitionistic 
logic independently of that of S4; this procedure will enable us, we believe, to obtain . . . 
the mapping into S4 as a consequence . ..I’. Let us add that the proof-theoretical results 
we obtain seem to be stronger than their “usual” versions with “unmixed” sorts. 
Let us mention two further specific features of the present paper. One is the 
emphasis on the fact that categorical logic is a natural extension of propositional ogic 
done algebraically. To bring out this very important, because constantly motivating, 
fact, we first give a treatment in propositional ogic of some of our themes, where these 
themes are in fact quite well-known; consequently, there is little (or nothing?) math- 
ematically new in Section 2. The reader may not have realized, however, that e.g. the 
Kripke completeness theorem for S4 propositional ogic is the same as the statement 
that a certain very canonically defined morphism is an S4 homomorphism. In 
Section 3, we guide the reader through some facts, some of which are still well known, 
although lesser than previously, that show that the propositional logic of Section 2, 
with all its canoncial constructions, has a striking lifting to predicate logic, resulting 
from generalizing preorders to categories, and, most importantly, from replacing the 
2-element order by the category of sets. 
Another conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that “everything in non-classical 
logics is based on coherent logic”. We believe that this somewhat exaggerated claim 
will become reasonably convincing in the course of the paper. This circumstance is 
one of the general conclusions of categorical logic not realized by traditional symbolic 
logic (although, by hindsight, elements of it may be found e.g. in the usual treatments 
of canonical models; see [ 133). The main instance appearing in this paper of the claim 
is Joyal’s theorem that presents the canonical “Kripke” model of an intuitionistic 
theory as a canonical construction based on the category of ordinary models of the 
same theory-category as a coherent theory. 
We have made an effort to make the paper self-contained, and easy-to-read for the 
reader with a certain background in model theory and non-classical logics. With the 
exception of some topos-theoretical terminology used in Section 8 (and at other places 
where it can be ignored without losing the continuity of the exposition), the paper 
relies only on the most basic categorical concepts without explanation. The standard 
reference for category theory is [25]. 
2. Algebras for intuitionistic and modal propositional logic 
In this section we discuss the Kripke semantics of intuitionistic and S4 modal 
propositional ogic, together with their extensions with operations dual to implication 
and necessity. We show how the category of distributive lattices forms a basis on 
which the Kripke completeness theorems appear as properties of canonical construc- 
tions, rather than existence theorems. In the next section, we will lift the ideas of this 
section into the context of predicate logic, by replacing 2 by Set. 
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DI denotes the category of distributive lattices (with least and greatest elements 
0 and 1, resp.) with lattice homomorphisms as morphisms. We call monomorphisms 
in DI and other related categories of structured posets conservative to emphasize that 
the important thing about them is that they reflect the order: f: A + B E DI is 
a monomorphism iff f(x) <B f(y) implies x <A y iff f is a one-to-one function. This 
usage will also accord with the notion of “conservative xtension” in logic. We 
abbreviate “distributive lattice” as “d.1.“. 2 denotes the two-element d.1. 
Let A E DI. A morphism h : A + 2 is identified with a prime filter p c A on A; 
x E p o h(x) = 1 (x E A). We write A* for the poset of all prime filters on A, with 
ordering the set-theoretic ontainment relation (with the elements of A* understood 
as 2-valued homomorphism, A* = hom(A, 2), the ordering on A* is the pointwise 
ordering inherited from 2). Now, for any poset (or even quasi-ordering) P, and any d.1. 
B, the poset BP of all order-preserving maps P + B ordered pointwise (using the order 
on B) is a d.1. again; in fact, the lattice operations are computed pointwise. The 
elements f~ 2’ can be identified with the upward closed subsets X of P: the 
identification is given by the relation p E X o f(p) = 1. In this way, 2’ gets identified 
with q7( p), the poset (ordered by set-inclusion) of upward closed subsets of P. Thus, 
we have the d.1. 2A’ (or Ppy(A*)) that we denote by A**. Moreover, we have the 
canonical “evaluation map” 
e,:A + A** 
x I- [f~ A* wf(x) E 21 (“function” formulation) 
p E e,(x) 0 x E p (,,set” formulation); 
it is immediate that eA is a morphism of d.l.‘s. The Stone representation theorem says 
that 
eA is a conservative morphism in DI. 
Let us emphasize the easily seen fact that (2.1) is equivalent o 
(2.1) 
the evaluation A + 21A*I is conservative; (2.1’) 
here, the power is an ordinary Cartesian power. 
For x, y E A, the relative pseudo-complement of x with respect o y, or the (Heyting) 
implication of x and y, denoted x -P y, is the element determined by the property 
forallzEA,z<x+y o xr\z<y 
provided such an element exists. A Heyting algebra is a d.1. in which all implications 
exist (actually, distributivity is a consequence of the latter property). A morphism of 
Heyting algebras is a DI-morphism also preserving implications. In this paper, Ho will 
stand for the category of Heyting algebras (the use of the subscript 0 is because a more 
prominent role will be played by H, the bicategory of Heyting categories; see the next 
section). 
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For any preorder P, 2’ is a Heyting algebra; for X, Y E gT(P), we have 
xEx+Y 0 Vy>x. YEX * yEY; 
in particular, A ** is a Heyting algebra. 
A conditionally Heyting morphism h : A -+ B is a d.1. morphism that preserves all 
existing implications: if x, y E A and x + y exists, then h(x) --) h(y) exists and is equal 
to h(x + y). A result that in [ 1 l] was attributed to Joyal is that 
e*:A-+A** is conditionally Heyting. (2.2) 
For the proof (which the reader knowing the “prime filter existence theorem” will find 
without difficulty), see e.g. [ 111. In particular, with (2.1), we have 
any Heyting algebra H has a (canonical) Heyting embedding into a Heyting algebra 
of the form 2’; in fact we can take P = H*. (2.3) 
Joyal’s theorem can be seen as algebraic formulation of the Kripke completeness 
theorem [17] for intuitionistic propositional ogic; for a discussion, see e.g. [ll]. 
The (Heyting) coimplication, or diflerence y\x of x, y E A is defined, if it exists, as the 
Heyting implication x -+ y in the opposite A” of A. In other words, 
forallzEA y\x<z o y<xvz. 
A coHeyting algebra is a d.1. in which all coimplications exist; A is a coHeyting algebra 
iff A” is a Heyting algebra. A biHeyting algebra is Heyting algebra which is also 
a coHeyting algebra. For these notions, see [21,22, 373. biHo will stand for the 
category of biHeyting algebras. 
For any preorder P, 2’ is a biHeyting algebra; for X, Y E 2’, we have 
XEY\X 0 3y<x. YEY&Y$X. 
As we show below, the last observation with (2.3) gives 
bi-intuition&tic propositional logic (bilPL) is a conservative extension of intuition- 
istic propositional logic (IPL), (2.4) 
a result due to Rauszer [34]. biIPL is obtained by adding the binary connective \ and 
the following rules to IPL: 
*\+-e @--cpve 
IclkrpVB *\cpl+ 
To say that biIPL is a conservative xtension of IPL means that if an entailment ql-$ 
with formulas cp, $ of IPL is deducible in biIPL, then it is already deducible in IPL. 
We will give an algebraic formulation of a strengthened form of (2.4), and show that it 
follows from (2.3). Since we will have several conclusions of the same general kind in 
the paper, we give a general setup to unify the discussion. 
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Let G:A --) B be a functor with a left adjoint F: B +A. Assume that 
every B E B has a conservative morphism BP!!!+ G(A) into G(A) for some A E A. 
(*) 
Then, 
for every B E B, the unit map nB: B --t G(F(B)) is conservative 
as well. The reason is that we have the factorization 
(**) 
with f the transpose of m, and if a composite h 0 g is conservative, then so is g. 
To apply the last remark, we let A,B be biH,, and HO, resp. The forgetful functor 
G : biH,, + H,, has a left adjoint F, for a Heyting algebra, F(H) is the free biHeyting 
extension of H via the Heyting map qH : H -+ GF(H). The posets of the form 2’ are not 
only Heyting algebras, but they are biHeyting as well: G(2’) = 2’; (2.3) says that (*) 
holds with an appropriate A of the form 2’. With writing 9biH for F in this particular 
case, we conclude that 
the canonical map nH: H -P Fbiu(H) of a Heyting algebra into its free biHeyting 
extension is conservative. (2.4’) 
Assertion (2.4) is a consequence; if H is the free Heyting algebra on a set L generators 
(“propositional letters”), then &i”(H) is the free biHeyting algebra on L; the Linden- 
baum-Tarski (L-T) algebra of the L-formulas of IPL is H, and the L-T algebra of 
L-formulas of biIPL is Ybiu(H); the conservativeness in (2.4) is equivalent o saying 
that this particular qH : H -+ cPbiH(H) is a conservative morphism. 
Since the just-described phenomenon is a recurring theme in this paper, we 
introduce some terminology. We say that A is a conservative enrichment of B (along 
G :A -+ B; we usually omit mentioning G since it will be an “obvious” forgetful 
functor) if (a*) holds. Let Y be a set of objects in B. We say Y is (or, the objects in 
Y are) representative in B if for any B E B there are Si E 9’ (i E I) and a conservative 
map B H n,,, Si. (The Stone representation theorem is easily seen to be equivalent o 
saying that (21 is representative in DI.) The implication (*) j (N+) proved above can 
now be put in the following form: 
if the objects in the image of G are representative in B, then A is a conservative 
enrichment of B. (2.5) 
A conditionally biHeyting map is a d.1. map preserving all existing implications and 
coimplications in the domain lattice. We have 
eA: A --f A** is conditionally bitieyting. (2.6) 
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In fact, as Michael Barr has pointed out to us, this is a consequence of the previous 
result (2.2). The point is that 2” E 2 (for any category, in particular preorder C, C” is 
the opposite of C). Because of this, in (2.1), 2” may be used in place of 2, and we get that 
the evaluation 
e’ : A” 3 (2o)hW.W”) 
is conditionally Heyting. But in general, for posets I and P, (I’)” = (I’)‘*, and 
a function between the underlying sets of the d.l.‘s C and D is a d.1. map C + D iff it is 
a d.1. map C” + D”. Thus, hom(A”, 2”) = (hom(A, 2))” and (2c)hom(Ao~zo) = (2hcm(A,Z))o; 
thus, e’ is a conditionally Heyting map 
Also, e’ is the same function on underlying sets as eA. Thus, eA as a map A” + (A**)“ is 
conditionally Heyting; as a consequence, A : A -+ A** is conditionally coHeyting. 
In particular, 
the lattices of the form 2’ are representatiue in biHo. (2.6’) 
Let us investigate the posets of the form 2’ (P any poset) more closely; they will 
occur frequently in the sequel. 2’ is the same thing as 9#‘), the set of upward-closed 
subsets of P, ordered by set-theoretic inclusion. Y,,(P) is a complete lattice, in fact, 
a frame (the law x A Vie,yi = VieI x A yi holds; this is equivalent to saying that we 
have a complete Heyting algebra). Since (2’)” = (2”)‘” z 2(‘“), 2’ is also a coframe. 
A prime element, or simply a prime, in a complete lattice L is any p E L such that for 
any (xi: i E I] c L, p < //iffXi implies p < Xi for some i E I. Pr(L) denotes the set of 
primes of L. One observes that in 9;(P), the elements of the form t(x) = (y E P: 
y 2 x}, x E P, are primes; and in fact, these are all the primes. 
We say that L is a prime-generated lattice if L is a complete lattice and every element 
x of P is a sup of primes: x = Vislpi, pi E Pr(L) (equivalently, x = V{p E Pr(L): 
p < x>). Clear1 y, pt (P) is prime-generated: any X E 9&P) is X = V{ 7 (x): x E X >. In 
fact, we can see that any prime-generated lattice L is isomorphic to one of the form 
S,(P): take P = (Pr(L))“, and note that the map 
cp: S,(P) ----, L 
x I++X 
isomorphism. Indeed, q is order-preserving; for X, Y E Pr(L), 
;x ?VY =z= X c Y follows from the definition of “prime”; thus, cp is order-reflect- 
ing and consequently l-l; finally, p is surjective because L is prime-generated. As 
a consequence, prime-generated lattices are frames, coframes, and the opposite of 
a prime-generated lattice is again one. 
Prg, the category of prime-generated lattices, has objects those named, and mor- 
phisms that preserve all (not necessarily finite) sup’s and all inf’s. 
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For any d.1. A, A** ~r2~* is prime-generated, and eA :A + A** is a lattice embed- 
ding. Does eA have a universal property among lattice homomorphisms of A into 
prime-generated lattices? The answer is “yes”; 
given any h: A + L, a lattice map into a prime-generated lattice, there is a unique 
map 6’: A** --) L of complete lattices (preserving all V and A) such that 
e.4 
A- A”* 
commutes. (2.7) 
Because of (2.7), we call A** the prime-generated hull of A. Before proving (2.7), let 
us list some properties, either obvious or already seen above, of the map e, : A -+ A**, 
which we now abbreviate as . : A -+ A: 
(i) .: A + A is a lattice homomorphism, A is prime-generated; 
(ii) for every prime element p of 2, p =A {R: x E A, p d a}; 
(as a consequence, 
(ii’) every element X of a can be written in the form X = Vie, I\jEJ,~ij with 
suitable elements xij E A); 
(iii) if&r sli < i (Xi, x E A), then A\iet’ xi < xfor some$nite subset I’ o~Z; 
(as a consequence, 
(iii’) . is conservative); 
(iv) r$ p E A has the property that p < Vicl xi, I finite imply p < lj for some 
i E I (“p is prime with respect to A”), then p is prime in A. (2.8) 
We will show that, assuming (2.8)(i)-(iv), . : A -+ A has the universal property 
claimed of eA in (2.7); it will follow that, for given A, (2.8) characterizes eA up to 
isomorphism. 
Because of (2.8)(ii), for p a prime element of A, e(p) has to be defined as 
~(p)=/\{hx:xEA,p<x} 
and in general, for X E 2, 
t(x) ==f v A {hx: x E A, p 6 x>; 
P<X 
here and below, p ranges over the primes of a. The general formula clearly specializes 
to the special one for p = X; as a consequence, 
8(X) = v l(P). 
PGX 
Since {p: p d Vi.tXi} = uist {p: p < X,}, k’ preserves V. Define, for q E Pr(L), 
t(4) &jjf Aq c hx i; x ranges over A. Using 2.8(iii) and the fact that h preserves A, 
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we see that 
c(q) < x 0 q < hx. (2.9) 
c(q) is prime with respect to A: t(q) < Visrii 3 q < h (Vie1 xi) = ViEI hxi 
a q d hi for some i E I * c(q) 6 li for some i E I. By (2.8) (iv), c(q) is a prime in A^. 
Since 
q d e( p) - for all x E A, p < i 3 q < hx 
and 
c(q) < p o for all x G A, p d 1 =+ c(q) < I+ 
by (2.9), we have q < e(p) e c(q) d p, from which, using the formula for e(X) and the 
fact that both q and c(q) are primes, we get q < f(X) o t(q) d X. Extending t to an 
arbitrary element u E L by t(u) = V(c(q): q E Pr(L), u < qj, we get that t is the left 
adjoint of e. It follows that ( preserves A. 
Now. consider 
W) = v e(P) = V A h(Y), (2.10) 
p<* PGiP<j 
to show that e(i) = h(x). e(a) < h(x) is clear. To prove h(x) d e(i), it suffices to show 
q < h(x) * q < d(?i) for all q E Pr(L), since L is prime-generated. Assume q E Pr(L), 
q < h(x). Let p = c(q) E Pr(,$. By the definition of c(q), p d 1. Eq. (2.9) says that 
q < l\r G ,(h(y), and (2.10) says that q < e(a). This completes the proof of (2.7). 
Ghilardi showed us an unpublished proof, due to him and Meloni, of a stronger 
form of (2.7), which asserts the universal property of A** not just among prime- 
generated lattices, but more generally, among completely distributive ones. This 
version also follows from (2.7) when combined with Raney’s theorem [33] according 
to which every completely distributive lattice is a complete homomorphic image of 
a prime-generated one. Proposition (2.7) is presented here as motivation to the 
generalization to predicate logic, the topos of types, due to the first author [26]. The 
topos of types will be quoted and used in Section 8. 
The operation ( )** on d.l.‘s is a functor ( )** :DI -+ Prg; e, ) is a natural trans- 
formation e, ) : Idn, + ( )**; in fact, these facts are seen directly, without (2.7). Comp- 
lementing fact (2.6) is the following: 
For a Heyting morphism (h: H + D) E H,,, h** : H** + D** is Heyting as well 
(2.11) 
(there is no version of this with “conditionally Heyting”). To see this, first we observe 
that 
for a map cp : Q + P of pose@ a suficient condition for (p* : 2 + 2Q co be a Heycing 
morphism is for 9 to be upward surjective: for any q E Q and p’ E p with p’ >, (pq, 
there is q’ E Q with q’ 2 q and (pq’ = p’. (2.12) 
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The proof is easy on the basis of the formula given above for implications in 2’; it 
was also given in [ 111. Fact (2.11) follows from (2.12) and 
For a Heyting morphism (h : H + D) E HO, h* : D* + H* is upward surjective. 
(2. 13) 
Assume p’ 2 h*q. We want q’ E Pr(D) such that 
4 = 9’ 
and h*q’ = p’, which latter means 
(2. 14) 
xep’ => hx E q’ (2.15) 
and 
z$p’ - hzeq’. (2.16) 
Let F = {y E D: 3v E q. 3 x E p’. v A hx < y}, the filter generated by quh[p’]; note that 
(2.14) and (2.15) together mean F c q’. For any particular z E H with z$p’, we have 
hz$ F; otherwise, u A hx < hz, v E q, x E p’; it follows that v < hx + hz = h(x -+ z) since 
h is Heyting; hence, h(x + z) E q, and since p’ 2 h*q, x -+ z E p’, which implies by x E p’ 
that z E p’, contradiction. Thus, the set I = {u: 3~4~‘. u < hz} is disjoint from F. By 
using that p’ is a prime filter, llis seen to be an ideal; we have the filter F and the ideal 
I on D which are disjoint. The prime filter existence theorem thus gives q’ E Pr(H) with 
F c q’ and q’n I = 8, as desired. 
Any morphism $ : K + L of complete lattices (preserving all sups and infs) has both 
a left and a right adjoint o -I I) -I q : 
In particular, with rp : Q --f P E Poset, the right and left adjoints of cp* :2’ -+ 2Q are 
computed according to the following formulas: 
ploy * ‘dqEQ (pqap =r qEY, 
ploy tj 3qEQ (pq<p&qEY (YE~~,~EP). 
(2.17) 
Now, with a morphism : H + D, on an element y E D, the left adjoint o of may or 
may not be defined; to say that it is defined is to say that there is a (necessarily unique) 
element oy E H with 
for all XE H oy < x o y d 1. 
Similarly, for the right adjoint q of I/I; 
for all x E H x < q y o i d y. 
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Entities like ( : H -+ D) form the category DI’; an arrow in this category is a pair (q, 6) 
forming a commutative square 
D6- D’ 
.T O T. 
H-H’. V 
Saying that (q, 6) is conditionally o-preserving has the obvious meaning: whenever 
y E D, q y E H exists, o(6y) also exists and it is equal to q(oy). Writing q : D I+ H for 
the partial right adjoint of. which is the partial function on D defined as explained 
above, this is expressed pictorially as the commutativity of 
IS 
D- D' 
H-H’ ; V 
and of course, when those adjoints are totally defined, we get an ordinary com- 
mutative diagram. A further property of the functor ( )** : DI + Prg is given in the 
next fact. 
For any (.: H + D) E DI’, the map (eH, eD):(.: H -+ D) + (.**: H** + D**) is con- 
ditionally q - and o-preserving. (2.18) 
Suppose y e D and q y E H exists. Looking at the definitions of eH, eD, and 
q : D** -+ H**, we see that the required equality e,(oy) = oeD(y) is equivalent o the 
relation 
oyfp * Vqe Pr(D) .*(q) &p 3 y~q. 
Here, the left-to-right implication is automatic. To show the other direction, assume 
q y$p; we show the existence of 4 E Pr(D) with .*(q) > p and y$q. The first of the two 
requirements is the same as . [p] c q. Let F c D be the filter generated by [p]; 
F = t(.[p]) = {z E D: 3 x E p. z B );_}. We claim that y$F. Otherwise, we have x E p, 
y > i2; hence, q y > x, q y E p, contradiction. By the prime filter existence theorem, 
there is q as required. 
By using an argument similar to the one above for (2.6) (involving 2” z 2) the 
assertion concerning the preservation of o is a consequence of the one for q . 
Let us call a structure of the form 2I = (h: H --) D), with h being an arrow in DI, 
a pre-S4 algebra if h has a right adjoint q . An arrow of pre-S4 algebras is an arrow in 
DI’ that preserves q in the sense explained above. A pre-biS4 algebra has, in addition, 
a left adjoint to the structure map h; a morphism of pre-biS4 algebras preserves both 
q , O. We have the categories pre-S4, and pre-biS4,; they are (non-full) subcategories 
of DI’. A map in either of these categories is conservative if both of its components are 
conservative. With any cp: Q -+ P E Poset, (cp* :P* + Q*) is a pre-biS4 algebra, 
Facts (2.18) and (2.1) imply that the latter type of pre-(bi)S4 algebras are representative 
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in both pre-S4, and pre-biS4,. It follows that pre-biS4, is a conservative nrich- 
ment of pre-S4,. 
Assume now of the pre-S4 algebra VI = (h : H + D) that D is a Heyting algebra, and 
that h is conservative. Then, we claim, H is also a Heyting algebra. In fact, for x, y E H, 
x + y = q (hx -+ hy), as the following sequence of equivalences how: 
u < q (hx+hy) 
hu < hx+hy 
hx/\hu 6 hy 
XAU < Y 2 
where the last equivalence uses that h preserves A and that it is conservative. It easily 
follows that if (q, 6): 2I + 2l’ is a morphism of pre-S4 algebras, both 2I, 2I’ satisfy the 
additional hypotheses, then r] is a morphism of Heyting algebras provided 6 is. Note 
that in this situation both H and D are Heyting algebras but h is not necessarily 
a Heyting morphism. 
There is a similar conclusion about coimplication being induced from D to H via 
a left adjoint o-lb. Thus, if h is conservative, D is a biHeyting algebra, and 2I is 
a pre-biS4 algebra, then H is a biHeyting algebra as well. 
We are mainly interested in the case when, in addition, D is a Boolean algebra. 
A (bi)S4 algebra is a pre-(bi)S4 algebra (h : H -+ D) in which h is conservative and D is 
a Boolean algebra. Morphisms of (bi)S4 algebras are those of pre-(bi)S4 ones. We 
have the corresponding categories S40 and biS4,,. Thus, we have that if (h : H + D) is 
a (bi)S4 algebra, H is a (bi)Heyting algebra; in fact, we have the forgetful functors 
S4,, + H,,, biS4,, + biH,,. 
The “standard” (for our purposes) (bi)S4 algebras are the ones of the form 2’~2”‘, 
that is, Pr(P) +@(I PI), the inclusion of the set of upward-closed subsets of P into the 
set of all subsets of IPI; here, P is any preorder. More generally, for any 
cp : Q -+ P E Preord, if Q is discrete and cp is surjective, then cp* :2’ + 2Q is a biS4 
algebra. 
For a topological space X, cO(X)++S(IXJ) is an S4 algebra, but not necessarily 
a biS4 one. 
The notion of S4 algebra corresponds to S4 modal propositional ogic (see [ 12,231). 
First of all, with (h : H HD) E S4 we may assume, without loss of generality, that h is an 
inclusion. In that case, q : D + H may be considered as a map o : D + D. Furthermore, 
we see that q : D + D satisfies the following: 
01 = 1, q (XAY) = OxAny, q (x+y)~Uox+oy, q x < x, 00x = q x. 
(2.19) 
Conversely, if D is a Boolean algebra with q : D + D satisfying the listed identities, 
then H = q D = {ox: x E D}, with the ordering inherited from D, is a distributive 
lattice, q is a map of D into N, and as such it is right adjoint to the inclusion h : H-D. 
In other words, S4 algebras correspond essentially in a one-to-one manner to algebras 
of the form (D, q ) with D a Boolean algebra, and the unary operation q satisfying 
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(2.19). On the other hand, S4 modal propositional logic is the extension of classical 
propositional ogic with the unary connective q obeying rules corresponding to the 
identities (2.19); see [12]. In other words, S4 algebras are an algebraic formulation of 
S4 modal propositional logic. 
The coS4 operation o corresponds to “closure”, just as o corresponds to “interior”. 
In modal, or tense, logic, it means “past possibility”, see e.g. [32]. The four proposi- 
tional doctrines Ho, biHo, S40, biS40 form the following square where all functors 
are forgetful: 
biS40 --+ S40 
(2.20) 
We have mentioned that the lower horizontal is a conservative nrichment. Using the 
same argument (formalized in (2.5)), and using (2.3), (2.67, we obtain that the two 
verticals and the diagonal are also conservative enrichments. Just notice that the 
representation theorem in (2.3) for Heyting algebras gives as representatives algebras 
the 2’, which are each the “H-” part of a biS4 algebra, namely 2’~2I’~. 
The fact that S40 is a conservative nrichment of Ho is the well-known fact that 
intuitionistic propositional ogic has a faithful translation, the so-called C&de1 inter- 
pretation, in classical propositional logic enriched to S4 modal logic. An algebraic 
treatment of this fact can be found in [23,24]. The usual account (see [38, Section 12, 
p. 351, also for predicate logic to be discussed in the next section) runs as follows. Let 
L be a fixed language for propositional ogic (set of propositional etters). Define the 
mapping 0 +-+ 0 of L-formulas of IPL to L-formulas of S4PL, S4 propositional ogic 
(add o as a new unary connective to the usual ones of CPL, classical propositional 
logic) as follows: 
B = q P 
t=t 
kdj=~~$ 
P=f 
(cp v 46 = $J v $ 
(<p + 91- = q (8 + Lf). 
Then, for any 8 E IPL, 
EIPLO * bwL~. (2.21) 
To deduce this conclusion, let H be the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L-formulas of 
IPL, that is, the free Heyting algebra on the set L of generators; (D, U) the Linden- 
baum-Tarski algebra of L-formulas of SIPL, that is, the free S4 algebra on L. Then 
C = q D is a Heyting algebra; let 9 : H + C be the morphism for which q(P) = OP. 
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Clearly, ~([e]) = Cd]; here the two brackets are equivalence classes in the respective 
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras. The left-to-right direction in (2.21) expresses that C is 
a Heyting algebra. The other direction says that q is conservative. 
Let fi A B be 9&(H), qH : H -+ fi the unit map of adjunction Fs4iG. We know that 
qH is conservative. Now, q is not quite the same as I]~, but the difference is slight. In 
particular, fi A i? can be described as follows. (6,~) is the free S4 algebra on the 
generators P, one for each P E L, subject to the condition q b = P; I? = q D; vu takes 
P to P (P E L). However, we have the S4 map (q’, 6): D --f ti taking P to p (P E L) 
because (D, o) is free: 
The composite q’q maps P to q/q(P) = r,~‘(nP) = d(P) = q P = P; it follows that 
q’ rl = qH (since H is free on L). Since qH is conservative, so is q. 
The remaining functor in (2.20), the upper horizontal, is seen to be a conservative 
enrichment by the following proposition, which is a form of Kripke’s completeness 
theorem for S4 modal logic. 
The algebras of theform 2’++2 Ipi P a preorder, are representative in S40 as well as , 
biS4,,. (2.22) 
Proof. First, a general construction. Given any functor F :A + B (in the immediate 
application, poset-map), we have the bijective-on-objects/full-and-faithful actoriz- 
ation 
where A]X is the category whose objects are those of A, and an arrow A + B in AlXis 
an arrow F(A) --) F(B) in X; the functors Fcl,, F,,, are the obvious ones, and they are 
bijective on objects, and full and faithful, respectively. Now, let (h : F ++D) E S40, and 
consider the following diagram: 
eff 
,2D’]H’ 
’ j = (h*)(2,:D*]H* + H*. 
‘* 
I 
(2.23) 
Without the right adjoints, all denoted 0, the diagram commutes; also, the quadrilat- 
eral containing the left and the middle q commutes by (2.18). Since D is a Boolean 
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algebra, D* is discrete; for L = D*] H*, and lL: (L ( -+ L the obvious map, 
2iD’l 2lLl 
k' T is the same as T It 
2D’]H’ 2L 
The commutativity of the triangle with the two O’S is a general fact. Recall [25, X.3., 
Corollary 33) that the left Kan extension G!(F) of a functor F along a fully faithful 
G functor extends F: G,(F)0 G 2 F. We apply this to G =j and an arbitrary 
F : D*] H* -+ 2; it follows that for the left adjoint j! of j*, j* 0 j! = Id. This implies that 
h** 0 j! = k*. Pas sing to the right adjoints of the three maps in the last commutativity 
gives the desired result. 
We conclude that (j* oeH, ea) is an S4 mapping. By (2.1), er, is conservative. Since 
Z& 
h 
I_,/ 
k’ 
j* Ed 
is commutative, j* 0 eH is conservative. (j* oeH,eD) is the desired embedding. 
Handling o is similar; in fact, the facts for o are consequences, by the “duality” 
2” z 2, of those for n. 
Result (2.22) is an algebraic form of Kripke’s completeness theorem ([ 161; see also 
[38]) for S4IPL. For more on the connections, see the next section. 
3. Intuitionistic and modal predicate logic as categorical doctrines 
In this section, we will go through a development paralleling the previous section, 
but for predicate logic in place of propositional ogic. We replace posets by categories, 
and the two-element poset 2 by Set, the category of (small) sets (and functions). Note 
that the notion of category generalizes that of preorder; preorders are those categories 
in which all horn-sets have at most one element. In Section 2, we considered various 
structures on posets, resulting in various notions of structured posets, starting with 
distributive lattices, ending with biS4 algebras. Generalizing those structures, in this 
section we have structures on categories, all defined by universal properties. All the 
structures on posets considered in Section 2 are defined by extremal properties; these 
are special cases of the universal properties in categories. For example, all categorical 
finite limits reduce to finite inf’s if the category in question is a poset. 
The role played by categories in the previous section, which was that of an 
encompassing structure for the algebras of interest, is taken over by bicategories. It is 
clear that in the previous section categories had merely an organizational role; 
similarly for the bicategories in this section. The essential role posets had previously is 
now due to the structured categories, the objects of the various doctrines (as we will 
call our bicategories) we will consider. Let us say a few words on bicategories here. 
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The notion of bicategory [3, 391 slightly generalizes that of 2-category; the basic 
concepts concerning 2-categories are treated in [25]. In a bicategory, the horn-set 
hom(A, B) of all arrows from A to B is in fact a category; there are arrows, 2-cellsf + g 
between arrowsf, g E horn@, B). The typical bicategory is CAT, the bicategory of all 
categories; here the arrows are functors, and the 2-cells are natural transformations. 
As a matter of fact, all bicategories considered in this paper are 2-categories. The 
reason that we call them bicategories i  one that has no visible effect here, and it is that 
the operations in the doctrines are bicategorical and not 2-categorical: in the 2-cat- 
egory of coherent categories 2-categorical limits do not exist; the bicategorical ones 
do, and are vital, although not in this paper. 
The process of lifting the contents of Section 2 into the context of this section is not 
a mechanical one. The reason for this is that it is not obvious what structure on 
categories one should consider. For example, the notion of coherent category (c.c.) 
generalizes that of distributive lattice (every d.1. is a c.c.); still, of course, this 
does not specify what c.c.‘s ought to be. On the one hand, some straightforward 
generalizations of poset structures are unmanageable. For example, the right adjoint 
of A x ( ): C + C, which is the straight generalization of implication, is 
exponentiation (of sets in Set), and belongs to higher-order logic, not (or at least 
not obviously) exhibiting “completeness” phenomena, which we are concerned with 
in this paper. On the other hand, there are new operations, especially the quantijiers, 
that have no counterpart in posets (that is, they trivialize when specialized to 
posets). 
In [29] it is explained in detail how certain categorical operations correspond to 
logical operations. The basic ideas of categorical logic are due to Lawvere. 
Joyal played an important role in the development of the concepts of first-order 
categorical logic; specific results of Joyal will be mentioned below. The 
overall contribution of [29], beyond specific results (some of which will be used in 
this paper), is the setting up of a precise two-way correspondence between the 
categorical and the symbolic formulations of logic. This correspondence nables one 
to use in the categorical context results obtained in the symbolic context and vice 
versa. This ability will be exploited in this paper. On the one hand, we will use 
methods of model theory, such as compactness, and saturated and special models. 
By going the opposite way, our results, in the first instance formulated categorically, 
give new results of symbolic logic. We will emphasize those results obtained in 
this way that are statements about pure logic, that is, about the syntax of logic, and 
which, accordingly, have, via Godel numbering, formulations (in fact, @-forms) 
in arithmetic. 
A category A is coherent (“logical” in [29]), if 
(i) A has finite limits; 
(ii) for all X E A, S(X), the poset of all subobjects of X is (not only a meet semilattice, 
by (i), but also) a lattice: it has finite sups; 
(iii) for any f: X + Y in A, f*: S(Y) + S(X) (defined by pulling back along f) is 
a lattice homomorphism; 
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(iv) for any f:X -+ Y in A,f*:S(Y) + S(X) has a left adjoint 
3r:S(X)-*S(Y): A dxffB 0 3,A <y B (A E S(X), BE S(Y)). 
(v) for any fas in (iv), and any pullback diagram as on the left, the right commutes: 
x L Y S(X) ‘I, S(Y) 
a\ o Tb j o*l o lb’ 
X’T’ Y’ SW) yfT S( Y’) 
Each S(Y) is in fact a distributive lattice, as a consequence of (iii) applied to 
monomorphisms X + Y. (v) is the so-called Beck-Chevalley condition for 3; it 
expresses that the operation 3 commutes with substitution (see also below). The 
standard coherent category is Set. 
A morphism of coherent categories, that is, a coherent jiinctor, is a functor between 
coherent categories that preseroes the operations defining coherent categories: finite 
limits, finite sups of subobjects, and the operations 3 /, for all fin the domain category. 
It is easy to guess what “preserves” should mean in each case here; see also [29]. 
Coh denotes the bicategory of coherent categories; in defining Coh we take 
a Grothendieck universe @ of which Set is an element; the objects of Coh are those 
coherent categories that belong to a. Arrows of Coh are the coherent functors, and 
the 2-cells all the natural transformations between the latter. 
A morphism in Coh is conseruatiue if it reflects isomorphisms: if an arrow is taken to 
an isomorphism, then it is an isomorphism itself. This is the same as to say that the 
induced morphisms on subobject lattices are all conservative. The notion of “conser- 
vative” will be defined in the same way in all other doctrines below. It is important to 
know that a conservative morphism, in any doctrine, reflects all the operations of the 
doctrine. For example, if a diagram is taken to a product diagram by a conservative 
morphism, then the diagram is a product itself. 
Let A E Coh. A morphism A + Set is called a model of A. Note that any functor 
M : A -+ Set is in particular an LA-structure, where LA is the many-sorted similarity 
type whose sorts are the objects of A, and whose operation symbols are the arrows of 
A; each operation symbol is unary, and it is sorted by its domain (sort of argument) 
and codomain (sort of value). It turns out that there is a canonically defined set C, of 
LA-sentences whose LA-models are exactly the coherent functors A --) Set; the natural 
transformations between coherent functors A -+ Set are the homomorphism (in the 
algebraic sense) of models. Thus, the horn-category homc&4, Set) is the same as the 
category of models of the theory TA = (LA, C,), the so-called internal (coherent) theory 
of A; we write Mod(A) for homcOh(A, Set). Furthermore, each axiom in ,& is of the 
form Vx’(cp -+ II/), where cp and II/ are coherent, that is, positive existential, formulas: 
built up from atomic formulas, also using equality (a separate quality symbol for each 
sort in LA, with both places sorted with the given sort), using finite conjunction, finite 
disjunction and existential quantification. We write cp T $ instead of VZ(cp -+ $); we 
call it a coherent axiom. A coherent theory is one whose axioms are all coherent. 
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For the above, see especially Section 3.2 of [29]. 
Every coherent formula over LA has an interpretation in A. Let cp be a coherent 
LA-formula whose free variables are among the ones in 2, a tuple of distinct (sorted) 
variables. With 3 = (xi)i<n, let [Z] = ni<,Xi where xi:Xi (xi is of sort Xi). Then 
[?q], the interpretation of cp in the context 2, is a subobject of [Z]. For the definition 
of [Z:cp], see especially Section 2.4 in [29]; [Z:(p] is written there as [q]?. We say the 
coherent axiom cp T @ is true in A, A\cp T +, if [Z?(p] GF1 [Z:+] (we write Gx for 
the ordering on the subobjects of X). Returning to TA, CA may be defined as the set of 
all coherent LA-axioms that are true in A. 
The internal meaning [Z:(p] of cp is related to ordinary semantics by the formula 
M([Z:q]) = {ii E M(X): Mhp[ii/q). (3.1) 
Here, M is any model ofA; on the left, we have the subset of M([Z]) that is the value of 
the coherent functor M at the subobject [Z:q]; on the right, we have the set (subset of 
M([iTJ)) of tuples that satisfy cp in M as an LA-structure in the Tarskian sense. (For 
(3.1), in fact in a more general form, with “models” in arbitrary categories rather than 
just Set, is 3.5.1. in [29].) 
For any subobject A E S(X), X E A, there is a (simply defined) formula A(x) (with 
x:X) such that [x:4(x)] = A. More generally, if X is a product Hi<,, Xi, and A E S(X), 
*we have a formula A(Z), with3 = (xi)i<n, xi:Xi, such that [Z&A(Z)] = A. Let US note, 
for the record, that for A a d.l., and hence, a c.c., a model M of A is essentially the same 
as a homomorphism A + 2 (M(1) = 1, and all objects in A are subobjects of 1); the 
notion of “model” properly generalizes that of “prime filter”; it is appropriate to write 
A* for Mod(A) (A E Coh). 
If B E Coh, and C is any category, then BC, the category of functors C + B and 
natural transformations between them, is again coherent, and in fact, the coherent 
operations in Bc are computed “pointwise”: the evaluations ec: BC + B (C E C) are 
coherent functors. In particular, we have, for any A E Coh, that A** ,Ser” is 
a coherent category. We will consider (in this paper) A** only when A is small. 
Further, we have the canonical evaluation functor 
e,:A-+A** 
I 
M H M(A) 
AI-+ h I I 
ha 
N N(A) 
A M(A) 
/I I- pm 
B M(B) 
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which is, because of the pointwise character of the coherent operations in Ser”, 
a morphism of coherent categories. The Godel/Deligne/Joyal completeness/repres- 
entation theorem is equivalent o the following statement: 
For any small A E Cob, eA :A -+ A ** is a conservative coherent jiunctor. (3.2) 
An equivalent form replaces Mod(A) by the set ) Mod( in the exponent; also, (3.2) is 
the same as to say that there are “enough models” in the sense that whenever 
A, B E S(X) in A, and A & B, then there is A4 E Mod(A) such that M(A) $M(B). For 
these matters, see especially 35.5. in [29], and Section 2.1 in [28]. 
Let k be a deducibility notion for first-order logic that is sound (with respect o the 
categorical interpretation): for any coherent category A and coherent C and O, set of 
axioms and axiom, resp., over LA, we have (Cka and A 1 Z) C= A l=o. The usual 
proof-systems, formulated for many sorted logic with (sorted) equality, with allowing 
possibly empty sorts, are all sound. With such k-, (3.2) is equivalent to the complete- 
ness for the coherent fragment of k : CFa o Cl--a for all coherent C and rr. In fact, 
this equivalence can easily be seen on the basis of what has been stated here so far. Let 
us note that there are (instructive) purely categorical proofs for (3.2) as well; cf. 
Section 2.1 in [28] and, in a topos theoretical disguise, in [ 11, P. Deligne’s Appendice 
of Expose 6. 
It should be noted (although this fact will not have an “active” role in this paper) 
that, conversely, for every coherent theory T, there is a coherent category B(T), or 
FcOi,( T ) that “represents” 7’ in every reasonable sense; e.g., Mod( T ) N Mod(y (T )); 
see Chapter 8 in [29]. 
A Boolean category is a coherent category in which every subobject lattice is 
a Boolean algebra. Set is Boolean. A coherent functor between Boolean categories is 
automatically Boolean, that is (in addition to being coherent) it preserves Boolean 
complements of subobjects. 
A Heyting category is a coherent category in which 
(vi) for anyfas in (iv),f* has a right adjoint V,-:f*B dx A o B GuVfA (A E S(X), 
BE S(Y)). 
In a Heyting category, each subobject lattice is a Heyting algebra: for 
A = [UC X] E S(X), B E S(X) we have A + B = &,(m*B). A Boolean category is 
Heyting. 
For future use, we note a formula in a Heyting category for expressing ageneral Vf 
in terms of implication and a Vn with z a product projection. Let f: X -_) Y, X A A, 
YAB,ZAX,@=[~]ES(X); wewant toexpressV,-@ES(Y)in termsofV=, with 
7~: A x B + B the projection. Let R’: A x B + A be the other projection. Let 
@J = [mp] E S(A), @ as a subobject of A. Let g: X + A x B be the composite 
(1.f) X--- +XxYZ A x B, and r = [g] E S(A x B), the graph offas a subobject of 
A x B. Then we have 
Vf @ = VJT -+ 7r’*@ A [n]. (3.2’) 
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A Hey&g functor is a fun&or between Heyting categories which is coherent and 
which preserves each operation Vf (in a sense similar to preserving !ls). For example, 
the formula (3.2’) implies that if a coherent functor between Heyting categories 
preserves implications and VE’s for product projections, then it is Heyting. One may 
talk about conditionally Heyting functors between coherent functors: this means 
preserving each &(A) that happens to exist in the domain category. H denotes the 
bi(Z)category of all Heyting categories, with all Heyting functors as arrows, and all 
isomorphism natural transformations between the latter, (Although in this paper this 
will not have any consequence it is important to restrict 2-cells to isomorphisms in 
order to obtain a bicategory with good algebraic properties.) 
For any category K, SetK is Heyting. With f:X + Y in Set”, A E S(X) (that is, 
A a subfunctor of X), we have that V,-(A) E S(Y) is given in the following way: for any 
MEKandyE Y(M), 
YE Vf(~)(M) o V’(h:M -+ N) E K. Vx E X(N). &(x) = Y(h)(y) 3 x E A(N). 
(3.3) 
In the special case whenfis a product projection rc: X x Y -+ Y, (3.3) becomes 
YE VI(A)(M) t> V(h:M -+N)EK. VXEX(N). (x,y)eA(N). (3.3’) 
There is a correspondence between theories in many-sorted intuitionistic logic with 
equality and Heyting categories, entirely analogously to the coherent case. We note, 
however, that we will use the internal theory TA = (LA, Z,) always in the sense of 
coherent logic as fixed above. 
In [29], we “conditionally” define the interpretation [Z:9] of any formula of L,,,>, 
for L = Lr, in any category C. That is, [?:9] will be defined and will be uniquely 
determined in case a certain set of instances of certain (possibly infinitary) categorical 
operations, all specified by universal properties, are defined. It goes without saying 
that this categorical interpretation coincides with the standard semantics when 
C = Set. Also, it coincides with Kripke semantics in case C = SetK, etc. In particular, 
if cis Heyting, and cp is any formula of first-order logic, [Z:9], the internal meaning of 
9, will be defined. Let us make some remarks in this connection. 
SupposeHis Heyting, M E Mod(H); 9:= Vxd(x,y); here, A E S(X x Y),x:X,y: Y. 
Let B =, [x: VxA(x,y)] G S(Y). Let y E M(Y). Then to say that y E M(B) is not the 
same as to say that MkVxA(x, y); the first interprets the universal quantifier internally 
in H; the second in Set. Note also that y E M(B) does imply MbVxA(x, y). Occa- 
sionally, we will use the notation [Vx] A(~c,y) for Bb), and similar other pieces of 
notation; [Vx] ,4(x, y) stands for a formula whose internal meaning takes into account 
the internal meaning of the universal quantifier. 
A fundamental result of categorical logic is the following theorem due to A. Joyal: 
For any small A E Cob, e, : A -+ A ** is condition&y Heyting; in particular, every 
small Heyting category H has a conservative Heyting embedding into one of the 
firm Set? (3.4) 
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The proof of Joyal’s theorem was given in [29]; see 6.3.5. in [29] (for an equivalent 
form) [disregard in (iii), [29], the clause referring to X + Y, which is mistaken]. For 
future reference, we mention some points of the proof, in fact, in a more general form. 
Let K be a subcategory of Mod(A); we have a (restricted) evaluation e:A + SetK. Let 
f: X + Y EA, A E S(X); assume Vr(A) E S(Y) exists. Translating (3.3) we get that 
e preserves Vf(A) iff for any M E K and y E M(Y), 
y~M(\df(A)) o V(h:M --+ N) E K. Vx E N(X). N(f)(x) = h,(y) => x E N(A). 
As immediately seen, the left-to-right implication is automatic. Thus, the condition, in 
the contrapositive form, is that 
for any M E K and y E M(Y), if yr$M(Vr(A)), then there are h: M + N in K and 
x E N(X) such that N(f)(x) = h,(y) and x#N(A). (3.5) 
In the proof of Joyal’s theorem, when K = Mod(A), (3.5) is proved by constructing 
N, h and x by the method of diagrams in model theory, with the compactness theorem. 
Joyal’s theorem is a “canonical” version of Kripke’s completeness theorem [ 171 for 
intuitionistic predicate logic with equality. Kripke’s theorem refers to a poset, and in 
fact, to a special poset such as a tree, rather than a category in the position of K. 
(Indeed, a Heyting functor H -+ SetP, with a poset P is the same as a Kripke model of 
(the theory corresponding to) the Heyting category H, with a system of possible 
worlds indexed by the elements of P. For example, the clause for V in Kripke’s 
semantics (“forcing”) corresponds to (3.3’).) However, we can obtain Kripke’s original 
version from Joyal’s by general arguments. We will describe the arguments because of 
their use later. 
Let us call a poset P = (P, 6) a tree if for every x E P, Lx =f {y E P: y d x} is 
linearly ordered by Q (thus, a tree may not be connected; it may be a “forest”), and 
a bush if for every x, y E P with x < y, the interval [x, y] =r {z E P: x d z d y} is 
linearly ordered. A bush (hence, a tree) is finitary if all intervals [x, y] in it are finite. 
A functor cp: P + K is upward surjectioe (compare (2.12)) if for any P E P, K E K and 
f: cpP -+ K in K, there is g : P -+ Q E P with (pg = f. cp is two-way surjective if both 
cp and cp”: P” + K” are upward surjective. A simple remark, generalizing (2.12) is that 
if cp : P + K is upward (two-way) surjective, then cp* : SetK + SetP is (bi) Heyting 
[for the“bi” version, see below]. (3.6) 
Now, we have 
for any (small) category K, there is P a (small)Jinitary tree, respectively, bush, with 
a functor cp : P + K which is upward surjective, resp. two-way surjective; also, cp is 
simply surjective on objects. (3.7) 
The construction of cp :P 4 K is straightforward; here is an indication for the case of 
trees. In what follows, Q, R denote finitary trees. We write Q c,R (R is an end- 
extension of Q) if Q is a subposet of R and R < Q E Q implies R E Q. Note that the 
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union of a chain of finitary trees ordered by the c,-relation is again a finitary tree. 
Given~:Q~K,QEQ,KEKandf:*Q~KinK,thereisRwithQc,R,andthereis 
0: R + K extending $ such that fis in the image of 8: just add a new element above Q, 
which is not below any element of Q. Attending to the simple surjectivity condition is 
even easier, although it is here that we are obliged to give up connectedness. An 
application of Zorn’s lemma finishes the proof. 
Returning to Kripke completeness, first of all, it is quite obvious that from (3.4) we 
can get a small subcategory K of Mod(A) such that the evaluation e: A + SetK is 
a conservative Heyting functor. Using cp from (3.7), the resulting composite 
cp* oe:A + SetP is the desired Kripke model: cp*, hence cp* oe too, is Heyting; since 
cp surjective, cp*, hence cp* 0 e too, is (clearly) conservative. 
A bifleyting category is a Heyting category in which every subobject lattice is 
biHeyting (warning: not whose opposite is a Heyting category as well). The “trivial” 
examples of biHeyting categories are the Boolean (coherent) categories. We have the 
doctrine biH of biHeyting categories and biHeyting morphisms. 
A Grothendieck topos is prime-generated if all its subobject lattices are 
prime-generated (see [26]). Another way of defining the same concept is to say 
that an object in a topos is prime if any (canonical) cover of the object contains 
a single arrow that covers, and to say that a topos is prime-generated if it has 
a generating set of prime objects. Note that any presheaf topos SetK (K small) is 
prime-generated: the prime subobjects of the functor X are the subfunctors A of 
X that are generated by a single element: for some K E K and some x E X(K), A 
is the least subfunctor for which x E A(K). As [26,27,2] show, and as we will see in 
Section 8, there are many more prime-generated toposes than just the presheaf 
ones. Any prime-generated (Grothendieck) topos is biHeyting; in particular, 
so are the presheaf toposes. Lawvere was the first to consider biHeyting toposes; see 
[21,22]. 
Our discussion of the concept of a “conservative nrichment” given in Section 2 
applies without change in bicategorical doctrines; in particular, (2.5) applies. Now, 
note that the target categories of the Kripke/Joyal completeness theorem (see (3.4)), 
namely the presheaf categories, are (not just Heyting but also) biHeyting. Therefore, in 
the same way as in Section 2, (3.4) implies that 
biH is a conseruatiue enrichment of H; the free biHeyting category over a Heyting 
category extends the latter in a conservative manner. (3.8) 
The idea of biHeyting predicate logic seems to be clear, because its categorical 
formulation is clear. However, its “symbolic” formulation is non-traditional. The 
reason is that symbolic logic implicitly assumes that all operations are invariant under 
substitution. The coimplication is not, in general, invariant under substitution (pull- 
backs). One way of setting up the symbolic version is to make the symbol \ for 
coimplication have an index 2, a tuple of distinct variables; thus, cp\ x $ makes sense iff 
the free variables of cp, $ are all among the 2. In any case, we have, as a consequence of 
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(3.8) that 
biHeyting predicate logic is a conservative enrichment of Heyting (intuitionistic) 
predicate logic. (3.8’) 
We have a Kripke-type completeness theorem for biHeyting predicate logic. 
The presheaf categories SetK (K small) are small-representative in biH; for any 
small HE biH, there is a small full subcategory K of Mod(H) (= the category of 
coherent functors H --) Set) such that the evaluation H + SetK is a conservative 
biHeyting morphism. (3.9) 
Let us note that, similarly as for the case of H, in (9) K can be taken to be a poset 
(genuine “Kripke model”). 
In this case, in contrast to the propositional case, the canonical version, with 
K = Mod(H), is almost certainly not true in general, although we have not construc- 
ted a counterexample. We postpone the complete proof of (3.9) to Section 6 where 
a stronger result will be proved; here, also in preparation of the later work, we spell 
out the “Kripke semantics” of the coimplication. Let K be an arbitrary category, 
X E SetK, A, B E S(X). Then B\A E S(X) is given as follows: for any M E K and 
x E: X(M), 
x E @\/i)(M) o 3(h:N --+ M) E K. 3 y E X(N). X(h)(y) = x & y E B(N) 
Thus, if K is a (not necessarily full) subcategory of Mod(H), X E H, A, B, B\A E S(X), 
then to say that the evaluation H + SetK preserves B\A is the same as to say that for 
any M E K and x E M(X), 
x E M(B\A) o 3(h:N -+ M) E K. 3y E N(X). h,(y) = x & y E N(B) 
& Y4NW). (3.10) 
In the last equivalence, only the left-to-right direction is non-automatic. When we 
want to prove (3.10), for a given choice of K, we are called on to construct, for a given 
M and x, some (h : N -+ M) E K with y E N(X) satisfying further conditions. It is then 
natural to impose a saturation condition on M for this to be possible. Indeed, K can be 
taken to be the subcategory of special models in a given cardinality; for further details, 
see Section 6. 
Next, we turn to modal logic. To begin with, let cp: J+ K be an arbitrary functor 
between small categories, and consider the derived structure 
‘p* : SetK + SeP (q*(X) = X 0 cp). (3.11) 
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It is well-known that (p* has both left and right adjoints: 
SeP 
n 4 cp’{ 7’ 
Ii 1. 
SetK ’ 
for Y : J + Set, n(Y) : K -+ Set is the left Kan extension of Y along q; y(Y) is the right 
Kan extension (see [25]). In any situation of the form 
D 
n _1 .-I 
Ii I 
I 
H ’ 
(3.11’) 
with H, D E Coh, y and n give rise to adjoints on subobject lattices as follows: for any 
X E H, we have adjoints ox, ox to the map h: S(X) + S(8) induced by the functor *: 
S(X) 
ox -1 --I ox 
Ii I (3.12) 
S(X) 
In fact, for A E S(z), ox(A) and ox(A) are obtained as follows. With A = [U E 81, 
ox(A) = [I/ AX], ox(A) = [W AX], n is obtained from the first diagram, a pull- 
back, and p from the second, a regular epi/mono factorization: 
A pre-S4 category consists, by definition, of two coherent categories H and D and 
a coherent functor . : H + D such that . has a local adjoint, that is, a system ( oX)XEH of 
maps as in (3.12). This means that each X E H has associated with it a pre-S4 algebra 
as part of the pre-S4 category structure. A pre-biS4 category also has the ox as in 
(3.12), for each X E H. A morphism ($:H--+ D) + ($‘:H -+ D’) ofpre-(bi)S4 categories 
is a pair (q :H + H’, 6 : D --) D’) of coherent functors, with a specified isomorphism I: 
D -s, D’ 
e i i 
t $v 1:6$ 
H-v+ H 
,(most of the time, I is 
S(X) L S(H) 
* T T *’ 
w)-v+ WIX) 
the identity) such that the induced map 
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(dots refer to the effect of both $ and $‘) is a pre-(bi)S4 algebra map. (a, 6) is 
conseruatiue if both components are, in the usual sense. Using isomorphism 2-cells, we 
have the doctrines pre-S4 and pre-biS4. 
The question why we consider the “preS4” structure instead of the more compre- 
hensive and more natural structure (3.11’) consisting of global adjoints naturally 
arises. The answer is that we rely on certain constructions uch as the one in (3.13’) 
below that give us functors that preserve the preS4 structure; we do not have similar 
constructions behaving similarly for the full adjoint structure. It is not impossible that 
there are interesting results, even of the character of a completeness theorem, for the 
full adjoint structure; but these will have to await further investigations. On the other 
hand, the pre-S4 structure encompasses S4 modal predicate logic as we point out in 
detail below; thus, the “partial” adjoint structure we isolate and investigate is relevant 
enough to merit consideration on its own right. Notice also the formal similarity of the 
modal operators as local adjoints to the quantifiers in coherent and Heyting catego- 
ries (see Section 3); in each case, the operator is an adjoint of a map between subobject 
lattices. This indicates that modal operators are in a “good company” from a categori- 
cal point of view. To add just one more point to this discussion, the quantifiers in an 
elementary topos can also be regarded as traces of more global adjoints, notably ones 
between comma-categories derived from the topos. The consideration of these more 
global adjoints is no longer “first-order logic” however; they do not, in the usual ways 
at least, lend themselves to completeness theorems. 
The standard pre-(bi)S4 categories are the ones of the form (3.11). With reference to 
(3.11) X E SetK, X = cp*X, the direct expressions for the operations ox, ox are as 
follows. For A E S(X), A4 E K, x E X(M), 
x E (oxA) 0 VN E J. V(h:M -+ cpN) E K. X(h)(x) E A(N), 
XE(O~A)(M) 0 ~NEJ.~(~:~N+M)EK. jy&(N). SEA 
& X(h)(y) = x. 
We have 
The standard objects (3.11) are small representative both in pre-S4 and pre-biS4. 
(3.13) 
Indeed, for the first of these doctrines, we have a canonical map that demonstrates the 
assertion: 
For 2I = (II/ : H + D) E pre-S4, the evaluation-map etLL : ‘i!I -+ a**: 
D ‘, D** 
$1 I*** 
H-TH** 
is a conservative (see (3.2)) pre-S4 map. (3.13’) 
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Since in Section 6, we will prove more general results, here we only make some 
remarks concerning the proofs of (3.13), (3.13’); these remarks will be useful later. Let 
us note that, in contrast to (3.13’), for the pre-biS4 case, suitable subcategories of H*, 
D* have to be taken for the exponents. 
Let 1+5 : H + D be an arbitrary arrow in Coh. Suppose K, J are subcategories of 
H* = Mod(H), D* = Mod(D), resp., such that $* : D* + H* restricted to J factors 
through K, thereby inducing cp :J -+ K. Then clearly 
D 2% SetJ 
#T TV* 
H -,’ SetK 
(3.13”) 
commutes; here, eD, eH are evaluations again. Let X E H, @ fz S(8); assume ox@, resp. 
ox@ exists, Using the above expressions for q x, ox, saying that (eH, eD) preserves ox@,, 
respectively ox@, is equivalent o saying that 
for any ME K and x E M(X) such that x$M(o#P), there are N E J and 
h: M + cpN such that h,(x)$N(@); (3.14) 
for any M E K and x E M(X) such that x E M(ox@), there are N E J, h: cpN -+ M 
and y E N(Q) c N(z) such that hx(y) = x. (3.15) 
Using (3.14), we can get the desired result (3.13’) (with K = H*, J = D*) by the method 
of diagrams similarly to Joyal’s theorem (3.4). More generally, we have 
For any Il/:H+D E Coh, by a suitable choice of cp: J+Kfor (3.13”), (3.13”) is 
conservative and conditionally biS4. (3.15’) 
For details, see Section 6. 
A pre-(bi)S4 category II/ : H + D in which each $ : S(X) + S(B) is (not just a pre- 
(bi)S4 but also) a (bi)S4 algebra is called a (bi)SI category. If so, then $ is conservative, 
and D is Boolean. If $ : H + D is an S4 category, then H is Heyting; for f: X -P Y E H, 
@ E S(X), we have that V,(Q) = q tJi(&) (we write, again, dots to indicate the effect of 
IL), as the following sequence of equivalences hows: 
the last equivalence uses that + is conservative. The fact that if 1(/ : H + D is biS4 then 
H is biHeyting follows from the corresponding fact for propositional ogic. 
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54 and biS4 are the doctrines of S4, respectively, biS4 categories; they are full and 
2-full sub-bicategories of pre-S4 and pre-biS4, resp. It is immediately seen that 
a morphism (~,6):(H-r D) -+ (H’ i D’) of (bi)S4 categories makes q: H --) H’ 
a (bi)Heyting morphism. Thus, we have the following square of doctrines and forgetful 
functors: 
biS4- S4 
41 
biH - H 
(3.16) 
We have 
Each forgetful functor in (3.16) gives its domain as a conservative enrichment of its 
codomain. (3.17) 
To see this, consider the following. For a category K, let 1KI denote the discrete 
category on the same objects as those of K; IKJ is just the set of objects of K in fact. We 
see that SetK is part of the biS4 structure I* : SetK -+ SeF, induced by the obvious 
functor I: lKj + K. Together with (3.4) and (3.9), this gives (via (2.5)) that the two 
verticals and the diagonal in (3.16) are conservative nrichments. The treatment of the 
last remaining functor in (3.16), the upper horizontal, needs a completeness theorem 
for S4. This, as well as another one for biS4, will now be obtained by suitably 
applying (3.13). 
First, a general construction that will be used later too. Let cp :J + K be any functor. 
Recall the construction introduced at the start of the proof of (2.22). J]K is the 
category whose “objects are those of J, arrows those of K”, Let ) JJ be the discrete 
category on the objects of J, I = 15: (J( -+ J the obvious functor. Of course, 
1 J/] K = J] K. We have the commutative diagram 
inducing 
Set’ - SeP 
+d> /I 0 
R* 0 
SetX 7 SeP 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
where we have indicated three right adjoints, all denoted q . Although we cannot say 
that the triangle having the first and second o’s as sides commutes up to isomorphism, 
the traces on the subobject lattices left by the functors that are the three sides of that 
triangle will form commutative triangles as a consequence of the conservativeness of
I*. This, in turn, follows from I being surjective on objects. On the other hand, the 
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triangle with the two rightmost o’s commutes up to isomorphism, by the same 
principle that was used for the corresponding part of (2.23). The same can be said with 
left adjoints o in place of the 0’s. Writing L for J]lv (“whose objects are those of J, and 
whose morphisms are those of X”), we have (J( = IL( and 8 = z~, and we obtain 
For any finctor cp: J-t K, the construction in (3.18) (3.19) gives a biS4 morphism 
S&I*-+ SetfLl 
IL* T T * 'r (3.20) 
SetX ---+ SetL e* 
Note that z* here is always conservative. If, in particular, cp : J + K is chosen as for 
(3.13”), then composing (3.13”) with (3.20), by (3.15’) we get 
For any @ : H + D E Coh, the construction in (3.20), with a suitable cp : J+ K, gives 
the conditionally biS4 morphism 
(3.21) 
in which eb is conservative. 
Note that, if in addition, II/ is conservative, then it follows, from the commutativity of 
the square, that e, is conservative as well. This suffices to conclude that 
the (bi)S4 categories of the form 12: SetL + SetILl are small-representative in 
(bi) S4. (3.22) 
Note that (3.22) gives biS4 is a conservative nrichment of S4; the categories in (3.22) 
stated to be representative for S4 are in fact in biS4. Result (3.22) for S4 is a form 
(generalization of) Kripke’s completeness theorem for S4 modal logic [15]. 
Let us discuss the symbolic logical meaning of the doctrines S4 and biS4. S4 
predicate logic with equality (S4PredL) (compare [38]) may be described as follows. 
With any (possibly many-sorted) language L (in the usual sense as for first-order 
logic), we define the formulas of S4(L) as having atomic formulas, including ones 
formed by the use equalities (one for each sort), and being closed under the usual 
first-order operations, and also under the operation of passing from cp to q cp; note, in 
particular, that the fee variables of q cp are the same as those of cp. The rules of inference 
(including the axiom schemes) of S4PredL are those of first-order logic with equality 
(with care for validity in possibly empty sorts), and the instances of the schemes 
corresponding to (2.19). (As the referee pointed out, the axioms VxVy. x =x y + 
q (x =x y) (x, y : X), one for each sort X, are consequences of the foregoing.) 
Given a theory T = (L, C) in S4PredL, we may form the S4 category Fs4( T ) = 
(. : H-D) as follows. D is defined as the “Lindenbaum-Tarski category” of T as in 
[29] for coherent logic (see Chapter 8, Section 2), except that we use formulas of 
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S4(L) instead of coherent formulas. For example, an object of D is an entity [Z:cp] 
(“formula in context”), with 2 a tuple of distinct variables, containing all the free 
variables of cp; in [29] [Z:cp] is written as [q(2)]. Arrows are defined as definable 
functional relations as in [29], once again using all formulas of S4(L). H is defined 
similarly, except that we use formulas, both for objects and morphisms, those of the 
form q cp only. Note how essential the role of equality is in the definition of the 
“Lindenbaum-Tarski category”, through the specification of what the morphisms and 
composition are. Because of the rule on equality mentioned parenthetically above, 
equality will be available in H, and we can show that H is a coherent category. The 
coherent functor . : H -+ D is defined essentially as an inclusion. 
It is easy to see that Ys4(T ) will faithfully serve in the categorical context in place of 
T. For example, Kripke models of T (see e.g. [38]) correspond essentially one-to-one 
to morphisms from Fs4( T ) to (zp :SetP H SetlPi) with P a preorder. Thus, (the case for 
S4 of) (3.22) contains (via the consideration of trees and such as in the (bi)Heyting 
case above) Kripke’s completeness theorem. 
Consider T and Fs4(T ) = (. : H- D). Note that every sort X will have a corres- 
ponding object [x E X: q t] in H, and thus, ps4(T ) has the following specific property, 
formulated for an arbitrary (. : H + D) E S4: 
For every S E D there are X E H and a monomorphism S H _?l; (3.23) 
in other words, every object is a subobject of an H-object. An arbitrary S4 category 
may, of course, fail to have this property; thus, the categorical doctrine S4 is more 
general than S4PredL. We now spell out what a general object of S4 means as 
a theory. 
Consider a language L as before, and a distinguished subset LO of sorts of L. Define 
the set S4(L/L,) of formulas as follows. This is a subset of S4(L) as given above; cp from 
S4(L) is in S4(L/L0) iff all free variables in the scope of every occurrence of the symbol 
q are of sorts belonging to LO. With this restriction, the rules of the logic are defined as 
before; e.g., the axioms for equality mentioned above apply only for sorts X E Lo. 
When we form the Lindenbaum-Tarski S4 categories Fs4( T ) for this kind of theory, 
we get, up to categorical equivalence, all the (small) S4 categories. 
Two more comments on S4 logic. One is that if condition (3.23) is directly imposed 
on S4 categories, the resulting bicategory is not “good’ (locally finitely presentable, in 
technical terms), and thus is not a proper “doctrine”. On the other hand, there is a way 
(using Lawvere’s formalism of “hyperdoctrines”) of grasping the usual logical notion 
of an S4 theory precisely; this was given by [S]. The latter approach also has the 
advantage that it accommodates logic without equality as well. Our doctrine here, 
except for the fact that it misses logic without equality, is wider, and therefore, positive 
results for it (such as completeness, interpolation, etc) are mathematically stronger 
than the ones for the usual logical, or “hyperdoctrinal”, formulation of S4. The last 
remarks apply to biS4 logic as well; in the “hyperdoctrinal” form, and restricted to 
countable theories, the result in (3.22) is due to [S]. For further comparisons, see 
Section 9. 
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The fact of the faithfulness of the Godel interpretation of intuitionistic predicate 
logic in S4 logic (restricted to the case of logic with equality), given a proof-theoretic 
treatment in [38], is essentially the same as the fact that S4 is a conservative 
enrichment of H, similarly to the corresponding situation pointed out in Section 2 for 
propositional logic, The point is that P&H), the free S4 category extending HE H 
satisfies (3.23) with a “canonical choice of the X’s” (as easily seen), and thus, it is an S4 
category of the “traditional kind”. 
4. Invariance under substitution, distributivity, the axiom of constant domains, 
and Barcan’s formula 
First of all, let us point out why universal quantification commutes with substitu- 
tion. Let H be a 
VJ(@) E S(B) exists. 
A 2, B 
a T T 0 b 
A’+ B 
coherent category. In H, let f: A + B and @ E S(A); assume 
Let 
(4.1) 
be a pullback diagram. Then, we claim, V&z*@) exists, and is equal to b*(VY(@)). 
What we just said is a careful “local” statement; in particular, if H is Heyting, the 
statement reduces to the “Beck-Chevalley condition for Vf”, that is, the commutativ- 
ity of 
S(A) JL S(B) 
a*/ lb* (4.2) 
SWT,-- SW) 
under (4.1). For the proof, and for similar proofs below, we use “adjoint squares”. 
Suppose we have the categories and pairs of adjoint functors as in the diagram 
‘I-B 
I 
;I II 
G 
-1 I i J 
c XD ; 
H 
actually, the two left-to-right horizontals are assumed only to be partial functors; they 
are defined on the full subcategories of their “domains” with precisely the objects for 
which the value (as an object of the codomain category satisfying a certain universal 
property) of the respective right adjoint is defined. The claim is that if the square of the 
left-adjoint functors commutes up to isomorphism, then so does the square of the 
right adjoints; and more specifically, if A E A such that G(A) is defined, then H(I(A)) 
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is defined as well, and is isomorphic to J(G(A)) ( a “strong” notion of commutativity of 
a square with two parallel functors being only partial is used here as well as below). 
The verification of this assertion poses no difficulty. Naturally, the dual statement 
with “left” and “right” interchanged is also true. Of course, if the categories involved 
are posets, we have strict commutativities. 
To return to the Beck-Chevalley condition for V,one notes that the square 
S(A) ,/L S(B) 
3,l 0 1% 
VA’) 7: SP’) 
is left adjoint to (4.2), and it is commutative because of the B-C condition for 3 in 
a coherent category. The “local” version also follows, with (4.2) understood with 
partial horizontals. 
There is a similar conclusion for modal logic. Let (II 4 D) E pre-S4. Then, for any 
f: A + B E H, we have the adjoint squares 
S(B) &(A) S(Q+ S(A) 
.I 0 1. -1 q .J 0 ycIA (4.3) 
S(B) 7 S(A) S(B) rY+ S(A) 
The left-hand square is commutative since . is a coherent functor. Hence, so is the 
right-hand square, that is, oa(f*@):= f*(o&) f or any @ E S(B) (where we used the 
non-symmetric symbol := to mean “if the right side is defined, so is the left, and they 
are equal”). 
In contrast to the above, the invariance of the coHeyting and the coS4 operations 
under substitution is far from being automatic. Of course, the invariance holds when 
the categories involved are Boolean, since then these operations are definable in terms 
of the classical ones. We will see below that, conversely, requiring the invariance under 
all substitutions of the coHeyting operation in a biHeyting category makes the 
category Boolean. 
Let HE H, f: A + B E H, @ E S (A). Then we have the adjoint squares 
S(B) k-5 S(B) S(B) z=- S(B) 
f’ I I f’ i a, T T a, 
S(A) T)Z SW SW) ‘f’sv( SW 
The commutativity of the latter square says that 
Vf(f*@v Y) = @ v VfY (4.4) 
for all !P E S(A); also note that the “left < right” part of the equality is the require- 
ment; the other inequality is automatic. Let us call f: A -+ B distributive if (4.4) holds 
for al @ E S(B) and Y E S(A); this make sense whenever Vf is totally defined, in 
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particular in any Heyting category. We conclude that, for a given arrow f:A -_) B, 
f* preserves all existing Y\@, S*(Y\@) = (f*Y)\(f*@), if fis distributive; in case 
the underlying category is biHeyting, “if” can be replaced by “if and only if”. 
We will be particularly interested in the condition on f:A + B being stab/y 
distributioe which is to say that for any pullback diagram (4.1). f’ is distributive. If the 
arrow !A : A + 1 is stably distributive, we say A is a distributiue object. This means that 
for any object X, the product projection rc : A x X + X is distributive. We will use this 
terminology also when the category H is assumed merely to be coherent; then by 
saying that A is distributive we will mean that &‘,: S(A x X) + S(X) is (completely) 
defined and distributive in the above sense for all z as above. 
For an intuitionistic theory T and a specific sort A in its language, requiring the 
axiom scheme 
Vu(cp@)v$(a,3) 3 cp($vVa$(a,2) (4.5) 
with cp and II/ arbitrary formulas with free variables as indicated (specifically, a not free 
in cp) is equivalent to saying that the object (corresponding to) A in S%,(T ), the 
Heyting category presented by T, is distributive. The condition in its last form is the 
well-known axiom ofconstant domains, so-called because of its role in Kripke models 
(see Section 6). The many-sortedness is not the essentially new element in our 
treatment here; rather, it is the fact that the axiom scheme is imposed on a relativized 
quantification. Imagine an ordinary (one-sorted) intuitionistic theory, with a specific 
predicate P(a). We may require (4.5) with Vu(. . .) replaced by V@(u) + . . .), and 
consider theories with having the resulting “constant domains axiom relative to P”. 
Our semantic theory in Section 6 of the axiom of constant domains will apply to this 
relativized variant, and yield a completeness theorem with Kripke models in which 
the interpretation of P is constant. This will come from the many-sorted version 
because the theory may be translated into a many-sorted variant in which P itself 
becomes a sort (the category theory automatically does this). Let us add that our 
extension of the original theory (due to Gdrnemann [lo]) seems to be a mathemat- 
ically non-routine generalization. 
We note that, with (4.1) a pullback diagram and 
b (hence also a) a monomorphism, iff is distributive, then so is f ‘; (4.6) 
thus, the stability of distributivity under the pullback along a monomorphism is 
automatic. Indeed, in this case any @’ E S(B’) and Y’ E S(A’) are of the respective 
forms @’ = b*@, Y’ = a*Y with @ E S(B), Y E S(A); then 
Vf,(f’*@’ v Y’) = kff’r.(f’*b*@ v a*Y) = V#*f*@ v a*Y) 
= Vj,a*(f*@ v Y) = b*Vf(f*@ v Y) 
and 
@’ v Vf,Y’ = b*@ v VJ,a*Y = b*@ v b*VJY = b*(@ v VfY); 
thus, the “primed” version of (4.4) follows from the “unprimed” one. 
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Recall that for @ E S(A), with @ = [X A A], and for any Y E S(A), 
@ --+ Y = Vm(m*!Y). 
Thus, the distributivity of m means that 
~+(rvY)=rv(@-+Y) (r,YEES(A)); (4.7) 
indeed, @ -+ (r v Y) = Vm(m*(r v Y)) = V,,,(m*T v m*Y)) = r v V,,,m*Y = r v (@ -+ 
Iv). Apply this to r = @, Y = OA (minimal subobject); the left-side of (4.7) is lA, the 
right is Q, v 1 @. We conclude that 
if 4p is a subobject deJned by a monomorphism which is distributive, then @ is 
a complemented subobject; (4.8) 
the converse is also easy to see. In particular, a Heyting category is Boolean iff all 
arrows (or, all monomorphisms) in it are distributive. 
After the last paragraph, it comes as a surprise that the condition of all objects being 
distributive is satisfied by many non-Boolean (bi)Heyting categories. For brevity, let 
us call this condition (L); also, we talk about an L-Heyting category, or L-biHeyting 
category. 
Lawvere has shown (see [22]) that for the presheaf category SetCoP to satisfy (L), the 
following condition on C is sufficient (and as Zolfaghari [40] has shown, it is also 
necessary): 
for any arrow f: A -+ B, there is a diagram of the form 
: f = hg, hj = la, ig = lA. 
Further, this condition is satisfied once C has binary products, and for any 
objects B and A, there is at least one arrow B + A; the latter is true e.g. if C is pointed, 
i.e.. 0 = 1 (e.g., if C is Abelian). (To see this, consider, with any a : B -+ A, 
a 
In contrast, the presheaf category Setc”” is Boolean (if and) only if C is 
groupoid (all arrows are isomorphisms). 
Next we look at what the condition (L) means in “symbolic” terms. 
Let us start with the observation (easily verified) that, in general, 
if@=[U&A], Y~S(A),f:A+B,thenV,-,,,(m*Y)=Vf(@+Y). (4.9) 
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Holding onto the notation in (4.9), let us see what the distributivity of VJ,,, means in 
terms of Vf. With r E S(B), by (4.9) we have 
V,,(( fm)*r) v m*Y)) = Vf’/,((m*f*r) v m*!P)) = Vf,(m*(( f *f) v Y)) 
= VJ(@ + ((f*u v Y), 
and 
r v VJ-,(m*Y) = r v V,(@ -+ Y). 
Since all subobjects of U are of the form m*Y, 
the distributivity of fm (see (4.9)) is equivalent to the identity 
v~;-(~-(f*rvy))=rvv~;(rp~y) (YE~(A)J-ES(B)). (4.10) 
Now, let n : V H X; we are interested in expressing the distributivity of the object I/ in 
terms of quantifiers VT for projections rt:X x Y --) Y. Given any projection 
6: V x Y + Y, we can write it in the form r? = no(V x n). Applying (4.10), with 
A=XxY,B=Y,f=n:XxY -+ Y, m = I/ x n, and as a consequence, @ = Z x Y, 
we get that the distributivity of E is equivalent o the identity 
With the logical notation the equality takes the form 
v~(zy + (ry v YYXY)) 7 ry v v~(Ey + YYXY). (4.11) 
Let T be a theory in intuitionistic logic. Recall that in the Heyting category F(T) 
presented by T all objects are of the form [j;: t(Z)], in particular, they are domains of 
subobjects of products of sorts. Using what we saw above, including the automatic 
stability of distributivity under pullback along a monomorphism applied to pullbacks 
of the form 
XXY-+ Y 
1 L 
xxv--+ I/ 
we can now conclude that 
saying that F(T) satisfies (L) is equivalent to saying that the axiom scheme 
here, the formulas have only the free variables shown; 5 and 3 are disjoint. 
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Although condition (L) is satisfied by many natural non-Boolean examples, weak- 
looking conditions additional to (L) will force Booleanness. For example, 
if an L-Heyting category has all its equalities decidable, 
=A = [A A A x A] E S(A) is complemented, the category must be 
Assume that =x has the Boolean complement zx, let A E S(X); with 
others, we get the following special case of (4.12): 
Vx(Ay + (Ax v x # y)) 7 Ay v Vx(Ax --f x # y). 
that is, each 
Boolean. 
(4.13) 
Y = X among 
(4.14) 
Now,usingthatx=yvx#y E TandAx -+(x = y -+ Ay) = T, we obtain that the xg 
left-hand side in (4.14) is identically true. Also, since x # y =z. 1(x = y), we have 
Vx(Ax -+ x # y) * 1 Ay. We conclude that Ay v 1 Ay = T, th”aYt is,A has a Boolean 
complement. 
I’ ! 
Here is another formula connecting two universal quantifiers. Let f: A -+ B, 
g:Y-tB,and 
A-B 
T*T q !I (4.15) 
X*Y 
be a pullback square. With m: X --, A x Y the canonical monomorphism, the subob- 
ject [m] E S(A x Y) is denoted by 2. The usual construction of the pullback as 
a subobject of a product gives, with 71: A x Y + Y the projection, and with 
G = [A’Z’A x B] E S(A x B) the graph of f, that 8 = (A x g)*(G) = [uy:fa = 
gv] E S(A x Y). For any Q, E S(A x Y), we claim 
V,,(m*cD) = Vn(w -+ Yp) = V,J(A x g)*(G) + @) = [y:Vu(fa = gy + @ay]. 
The verification is routine. We now derive a consequence of the formula. 
Assume B is a Boolean category, B i H is c1 coherent functor that takes every 
object of B to a distributive object. Then . takes all arrows of B to stably distributive 
arrows. (4.16) 
Indeed, let (4.15) be a pullback in H, with f =fO coming from B. Using the above 
notation, G = GO with GO graph ofjO. Since GO has a complement (in B), so does G (in 
H). Any pullback of a subobject with complement has a complement; thus, X has 
a complement, say Y. It is clear that, as a consequence, X + @ = Y v @ for any 
~~S(AxY).Letn~S(Y);anysubobjectofXisoftheformh*~fora~~S(AxY). 
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Consider 
vj @*A v m*q = Vh (m*(n*n v @)) = Vz(W + (x*/l v cp)) = V%( Y v (7c*A v @)) 
=v~(~*nvYv~))~/ivv~(Yv~)=nvv~(S~~) 
= n v Vh (WI*@); 
this proves our assertion. 
Let us turn to invariance of the past-possibility operator under substitution. With 
data as for (4.3), assume that Vf and V’ are totally defined, and consider the adjoint 
squares 
j* 
S(B)- S(k) S(B) x S(k) 
oBy 0 yol -I T 0 1 
S(B) /’ S(A) S(B) 7 S(A) 
The commutativity of the left-hand square expresses the invariance of o under 
substitution along f: We conclude that 
for H + I) E pre-biS4, ifH, D are Heyting, o is invariant under substitution along 
f $7. preserves Vf. (4.17) 
In particular, if the structure map of a pre-biS4 category is Heyting, then its past- 
possibility operator is fully invariant under substitution. 
In case * : H + D is also conservative, then, as we know, \ in His expressible in terms 
of the same operation in D and o; 
if o and \ in D are invariant under substitution along f, then so is \ in H: 
f*(Y\@)=f*(o(e\dq)= of*(!P\@q 
= o(f*W*6)=o((f*~j\(f*~j)=(f*wdf*w. (4.18) 
Assume . : H H D E pre-S4, is conservative, and D is Heyting. We know that then H 
is Heyting as well. Let f :A -P B E H, Q, E S(A); we have V,(Q) = q Vj(b). To say 
that . preserves ‘d,, i.e., (V’(Q))’ = V’(d), is to say that 
(oV@)) = V@). 
@ is a typical subobject of the form or, r E S(B) (since @ = q b); we get 
(oV&T)‘)’ = Vf((OV). 
Let us assume (without loss of generality) that ( )’ is an inclusion; in particular, each 
induced map S(Y) i S(Y) is an inclusion; let us drop the dots: 
dfJjor = vfd (r E s(B)). (4.19) 
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We have to keep in mind that here everything takes place in D; q r is meant as 
a subobject of B in D, etc. Now, we claim that the last identity is the same as 
q tr,r = tr,,r (r E S(B)). (4.20) 
Indeed, (4.20) applied to or in place of r gives (4.19) since q ur = or. On the other 
hand, note that q r 6 r gives q Vf;-or d &J, and f *Vfr G r * 0 f *VJr 6 q r
- f *dq- G d- j d+r 6 kffur; we conclude (in general) that q Vf;oT < 
q V,;-T < VJnT. Now, it is clear that (4.19) implies (4.20). 
Eq. (4.20) is the so-called Barcan’sformula (see, e.g., 1121) of modal logic. What we 
have seen is that 
In case . : HH D E pre-S4 is conservative, D E H, f E Arr(H), Barcan’s formula for 
kff expresses that . preserves Vf. (4.21) 
For any Hi D in Cob’, we say that an object A E H is a Barcan object if for all 
product projections rc : A x X + X in H, Vn is completely defined, and is preserved by . 
In case T is an ordinary SCtheory, with a specific sort A, then to say that (the object 
corresponding to) A is Barcan in Rs4(T) is to say that the axiom scheme 
Vaurp + uVacp (a: A) (4.22) 
(with rp an arbitrary formula, with possibly free variables) holds. The converse 
implication to (4.22) is automatic. 
Assume. :H H D E S4. Then of course all Vg in D are distributive. Thus, if. preserves 
Vf, then the distributivity of Vi is reflected down along the conservative morphism 
We conclude that 
if : H - D is an S4 category, f E Arr(H), and Barcan’s formula holds for Vf, then Vf 
satisjies the axiom of constant domains in H. (4.23) 
5. A preservation theorem 
In this section, we are squarely in the context of model theory. We go through some 
basic definitions of model-theoretical concepts; in the literature, these are stated in the 
one-sorted context. 
Let us fix a language L; all structures and formulas are over L unless otherwise 
stated. Let #inf(L) denote the cardinality which is the maximum of Kc, and the 
cardinality of the set of all sorts, operation symbols and relation symbols in L . # inf(L) 
is the same as the cardinality of the set of all L-formulas. 
Every structure is isomorphic to one, say M, which is separated, that is, for which 
M(X)n M(X’) = 8 for any two distinct sorts X, X’. Because of this, we may usually 
assume that our models are separated. 1MI =f ux M(X); if M is separated, I M 1 can 
be taken to be U x M(X); X ranges over all sorts. The cardinality of M, #M, is the 
cardinality of the set 1 M (. 
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Let M be any separated structure. The diagram-language L(M) is the extension of 
L by hdividual constants, one for each x E (MI; the constant corresponding to x is 
denoted by x as well; x E M(X) is of sort X. For any A c 1 MI, L(A) is the sublanguage 
of L(M) with only the constants in A added to L. M* = (M, x),,,~, is the obvious 
L(M)-structure expanding M. With A c 1 MI, we say that M is A-saturated if for any 
set Q(x) of formulas over L(A) with a single free variable x, if every finite subset @’ of 
@ is satisfiable in M* (M* t= Ixl\ W(x)), then @ itself is satisfiable in M* 
(M* b 3x/j G(x), the last formula being possibly infinitary). With K an infinite cardinal, 
M is K-saturated if for all A c 1 MI of cardinality <K, M is A-saturated. We have that 
if u > #i”,(L) and M is a structure of cardinality < K, then there is a rc+-saturated 
structure of cardinality at most 2”, with an elementary embedding h : M + N; 
the proof is the same as for the one-sorted version in [4, 51.4, p. 2941. 
Let us fix an infinite cardinal h such that 1 b # i,f(L). Let A0 = 1, I,+ 1 = 2”n for 
n < o. Let k < w and let 
ho h h. Mo-+M1--,M2-+...-M,-+ M,+I-... (5.1) 
be a chain of structures with elementary embeddings as connecting morphisms such 
that J&,, + I is Al+.-saturated and of cardinality at most /In+k+, . Any structure M of the 
form cc!‘,m M,, the colimit of a chain as described, is called a ,I-special structure; (5.1) 
is a specializing chain for M. In what follows in this section, 1 is sometimes dropped 
from “l-special”, since 3L will not be varied in this section; however, we need to be able 
to vary 1 in the applications. 
Note the parameter k is the above definition; let us say that the specializing chain, 
or the special structure, is k-based. It is clear that if a (special) structure has a k-based 
specializing chain, then it has an k-based specializing chain for any 8, k < e -C CU. In 
fact, it turns out that the base-parameter is superfluous; every special structure has 
a O-based specializing chain; see below. Also note that every special structure has 
a specializing chain with each connecting morphism and each colimit coprojection 
being an inclusion; in this case, the special structure is the union of the specializing 
chain. In this case, we refer to the specializing chain in the form (M,),,,. 
By the above existence theorem, we have that 
any structure of cardinality at most I can be elementarily extended to a (O-based) 
A-special structure. 
We also have the uniqueness theorem 
any two elementarily equivalent I-special structures are isomorphic. 
See 51.17, p. 300 in [4] for the proot Proposition 5.1 below is in fact a generalization. 
The existence and uniqueness theorems together say that every complete theory over 
L has a (O-based) I-special model which is unique up to isomorphism. Our remark 
about the superfluousness of the base-parameter is a consequence. 
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If M is special, a E M(A), then the L({a})-structure (M, a) is also special. What is 
clear directly from the definition is that if M is k-based special, then (M, a) is e-based 
special, with G 2 k chosen so that a E ) M/I; here, (M,),,, is the specializing chain 
for M. 
For later reference, let us note another well-known, and obvious, property of special 
structures: 
for any sublanguage LO of L, if the L-structure M is A-special, then so is its 
LO-reduct M IL,. 
Let A be a set of specific sorts in L. A morphism h: M -+ N is A-surjectiue if 
h,: M(A) + N(A) is surjective for all A EA. lMIA will abbreviate UAEA M(A); and 
hA = UAEA hA; thus, the requirement is that hA : (MIA + IN IA be surjective. 
Let VA denote the least set of formulas containing all atomic L-formulas, and closed 
under the operations A, v, Sx for all variablesx, and Va for variables a of sorts A in A. 
If A = 8, V. is the set of coherent formulas; when,4 is the set of all sorts, VA is the set of 
positive formulas. Note the easily seen fact that an A-surjective map preserves (the 
validity of) any formula in VA. The following proposition generalizes 52.11, p. 314 
in [4]. 
Proposition 5.1. Suppose M and N are I-special structures such thatfor every sentence 
CT E VA, M k r~ implies N k 6. Then there is an A-surjective morphism h: M + N, 
Let M, N be structures (not yet the ones in the assertion of the proposition), assumed 
separated. A relation R c ) M 1 x I N( is an V‘-relation (for M and N) if for any 
x’= (Xi)1 Gibm7 Y= (Yi>l <i<mr \ . Xi E M(Xi), yi E N(Xi) (1 < i < m), if XiRyi for 
1 d i < m (which we abbreviate as ?Ry’), then for any cp E VA;, M I= cp[x’] implies 
N i= (P[JJ]; this includes the condition that xRy and x E M(X) imply y E N(X). We 
have the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.2. Suppose M and N are x-saturated, R c (M ( x 1 N 1 an VA-relation with 
dam(R) c I M 1 and range(R) c IN ( both of cardinality < K. Then 
(i) for any x E I M 1, there is y E INI such that Ru {(x, y)} is an VA-relation; 
(ii) for any b E IN IA, there is a E ) M IA such that Ru ((a, b)} is an VA-relation. 
Proof. (i) Let x E ) M 1, and let Q(x) be the set of all formulas of the form cp(y, x) 
obtained from some c,@, x) E VA and Jr such that for some x”, x’R9 and M k q[Z, x]. 
A moment’s reflection shows that @ is closed under finite conjunction. Given any 
cp( y, x) in @ with jz as in the definition, 3x(p(Z, x) E VA and M* k 3 XC&~‘, x). Thus, since 
R is an VA-relation, N* 13x(p(jJ, x); thus, there is y E 1 N 1 with N* k cp(y’, y); this shows 
that @ is finitely satisfiable in N*. Using the saturation of N, we have some y E IN I 
satisfying G(x) in N*. It is clear that Ru {(x, y)} is then an V’-relation. 
(ii) is quite similar, interchanging the roles of M and N, and using the availability of 
the universal quantifiers Va with a : A, A E A, in forming formulas in V’. 0 
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Proof of 5.1. Let (M,),<, be specializing chains for M, N, resp. (M and N are each 
the simple union of the specializing chain); we assume that both are k-based (thus, we 
are not using our remark above on the dispensability of the base-parameter; in fact, 
with an easy trick of changing languages, the uniqueness result, used in seeing that 
dispensabihty, can be deduced from Proposition 5.1). By induction on n < w, we 
define R,, an V,,-relation for M,, 1 and N,, 1, such that the following hold: 
(iii) (M,( c dom(R,); 
(iv) INA c range(RA; 
(v) R,-1 c R,. 
Suppose n = 0, or that for n - 1, R,_ 1 has been defined. In case n = 0, R d;f 8 is an 
VA-relation for MO and No; this is the assumption of Proposition 5.1 (with i! and 
y’ being the empty tuples in the definition of “VA-relation”). Thus, in any case, we have 
an V’-relation R( = R, _ 1 if n > 0) for M, and N,; we want to extend it to another one, 
for M,+i and N,+l, with additional properties (iii), (iv). We employ enumerations 
(xA<,, (bJ,<, of the sets (M,(, (N,(,,, resp.; here, v = A k + n (unless either of those sets 
is empty, in which extreme case an obvious alternative is used). By induction on /3 < v, 
we define the increasing chain (RB)s<y of &-relations for M,+ 1 and N,, 1. If fl < v, 
and the RY have been defined for y < v, then R d~f Rv uyCB RY is an &-relation for 
M “+ 1 and N,,+ 1. For B = c( ’ 2 even Rp is chosen as R u ((xLI, y)> for a suitable y, by the 
use of 5.2(i), with M,,, 1, N,+ 1 and R as M, N, and R, resp.; note that M,+ 1, N,+ 1 are 
vi-saturated, and the domain and range of R are of cardinality 6v. Similarly, if 
/3 = cr.2 + 1, RP zf &~((a, b,)) f or a suitable a, by applying 5.2(ii). This completes 
the definition of ( RB)8<V. We put R, = u BrV RD. The construction ensures that R, is 
as required. 
Having defined the sequence (R,),,,, we take the union R = 
u “cm R, c (M( x INI. It is clear that R is an VA-relation for M and N. Since the 
equality-formulas x =xx’ are in VA, R is the graph of a function h, and in fact, 
h = Uxhx, with h, a function with domain and range included in M(X) and N(X), 
respectively, for each sort X. Conditions (iii) and (iv) ensure that dam(h) = I Ml and 
range(hA) = lNjA, Using that the atomic formulas are in V’, we see that h defines 
a morphism h : M + N, which is in fact A-surjective, by the previous sentence. 0 
Proposition 5.1 just proved will be used in the next section in its present form. 
However, we note that it has the following consequence, of the form of a “preservation 
theorem”, deduced by the standard methods (see [4, 52.13, p. 3153). 
Corollary 5.3. If an L-sentence TV is preserved by all A-surjective morphisms of L- 
structures, then CT is logically equivalent o an V,,-sentence. 
6. Kripke models with selected constant domains 
Consider a category C, and the functor category Setc. The latter is (among others) 
a coherent category, and its coherent structure is computed pointwise, that is, each 
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evaluation ec : SetC --) Set is coherent. Set’ is also a Heyting category, but the further 
elements of its Heyting structure are not computed pointwise in general any more. 
There are, however, some special facts in this connection. Ler us call a functor 
FE Set’ componentwise surjectiue (c.s.) if for all fe Arr(C), F(f) is a surjective 
function. 
Observation 6.1. With F c.s., G any finctor E Set’, and with the product projection 
7c : F x G 4 G, Vx(@) is computed pointwise. 
Proof. We claim that V,J@)(C) = t/,,.(@(C)) as subsets of G(C). We have, for x E G(C), 
x E K(@)(C) * 
V(C $ D). Vy E FD. (y, (Ff)x) E @D, (6.1) 
and x E Vn’,,(@(C)) o
Vz E FC. (z, x) E QC. (6.2) 
Expression (6.2) is the instance of (6.1) with f= lc. But, assuming (6.2), to show (6.1), 
take any C 5 D and y E FD; since Ffis surjective, there is z E FC with (Ff)z = y; by 
(6.2), (z, x) E @C and the functoriality of @. ((Ff)z, (Ff)x) E @D, that is, 
(y, (Ff)x) E @D, as desired. 
As a consequence, very C.S. functor F E SetC is a distributive object (see Section 4) 
in Setc, that is, n is a distributive arrow ( Vn is distributive), for any product projection 
71 of the form rc : F x G + G. Indeed, the set of evaluations e, : Set’ + Set (C E C) is 
a conservative family of coherent functors preserving each V_(Q), into Set in which all 
Vf are distributive; it follows that Vx is distributive. 
Suppose H is a Heyting category, with a set A of distinguished objects in H. We ask 
under what conditions we can have a conservative Heyting functor of the form 
M : H + Set= so that, in addition, for each A E A, M(A) is a C.S. functor. An obvious 
necessary condition is that each A E A be a distributive object in H, since distributivity 
will be reflected through M from Setc. The essence of the next theorem is that the said 
condition is also sufficient. 
Theorem 6.2. Let H be a small coherent category, A a set of distributive objects in H. 
Then there is a small (non-full) subcategory K of Mod(H) such that, with e: H -+ SetK 
the evaluation, we have e is conservative, conditionally Heyting, conditionally coHeyting, 
and for all A E A, e(A) is a componentwise surjective functor in SetK. 
Until the end of the proof of the theorem, we fix Hand A as in the hypothesis of the 
theorem. 
Given that K is a subcategory of Mod(H), the last requirement in the theorem is the 
same as to say that each (h : M + N) E K is A-surjectiue, i.e., for each A E A, the 
component hA : MA -+ NA is a surjective function. 
We obtain a necessary condition on objects M E K, for K to serve as in the theorem, 
as follows. Let K E K, A E A, n : A x X + X. Then M = eM 0 e, and since, by the above 
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discussion, eM preserves Vee(+ M :H -+ Set preserves Vz. M E Mod(H) is called A- 
standard if M preserves ‘J, whenever n : A x X -+ X is a product projection, with A E A; 
that is, for @ E S(A x X), 
M(\d,@) = {x E X: Va E M(A). (a, x) E @>. 
Equivalently, (6.3) can be written as 
(6.3) 
M 1 Vx E X( V @(x)HVa E A. $+a, x)); II (6.3’) 
thus we see that being A-standard is a Jim-order condition, although expressing it 
requires stepping out of coherent logic. 
We conclude that it is necessary to restrict the objects in K to A-standard ones. 
Using the diagram language of M, and transforming (the non-automatic part of) 
the condition, we see the A-standardness of M means that 
M*kl[V’a]cp(a) * 3aEM(A). M*klcp[a] (6.3”) 
holds for all A E A, (I: A, and all coherent (equivalently, all atomic) formulas q(a) over 
L(M). 
A morphism h: M + N in Mod(C), C any coherent category, is called pure if h not 
only preserves but also reflects all subobjects: for any @ E S(X), x E M(X), we have 
h,(x) E N(Q) o x E M(Q); that is, x#M(@) * h,(x)$N(@). Let Diag’(M) denote 
the set of coherent sentences over L(M) that are true in M*. Let Diag- (M) denote the 
set of sentences 10 over L(M), with 0 coherent, that are true in M*. It is clear that, 
with N g Mod(C), (N, z$~,~, kDiag+(M), respectively (N, &MI k Diag+(M)u 
Diag-(M) iff h:M + N, respectively h: M + N is pure, for h defined by h(x) = 2 
(x E 1 MI). In the next three lemmas, 1 is any cardinal such that 1 2 #i,,(H); # inr(H) is 
the maximum of K,, and the cardinality of Arr(H). 
Lemma 6.3. Any M E Mod(H) of cardinality ~1 has a pure extension which is 
A-standard and of cardinality ,< 2. 
Proof. Let us show that any M E Mod(H) has a pure extension M \ N that honors 
a single preassigned instance of (6.3”) originating in M. In other words, 
ifa:AEA, cp(a)~L(M)u{a} and M*kl[V’a]cp(a), then thereare M >N and 
a E N(A) such that (N, h(x)),,lMI bl(p[a]. (6.4) 
Once (6.4) is shown, a straightforward argument involving directed colimits will 
establish the lemma; note that a directed colimit of pure morphisms is pure. 
Assume the hypotheses in (6.4). It suffices to show that 
&,uDiagf(M)uDiag-(M)u(iip(a)j 
is L(M)u{a}-consistent. By compactness and the fact that both Diag+(M) and 
Diag-(M) are closed (up to logical equivalence) under finite conjunction, it is enough 
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to take p E Diag+(M) and -~(r E Diag- (M) and see that 
UJ{P~lo~lcp(a)1 (6.5) 
is L&u’)-consistent where u’ is a repetition-free tuple of M-constants containing all 
those occurring in (6.5). Expression (6.5) inconsistent means that C, I- p ,T o v 9(u); 
that is, 
[aii:P] d [&:a v 9(a)]. 
It follows that 
[ii:p] < [ii:Vu(o v 9(a))]. 
Since 0 does not contain II, the distributivity of A says that 
[ii:Vu(a v 9(a))] = [ ii:0 v Vacp(u))] = [ii:o] v [u’:[Vu]9(u)]; 
and thus 
[r;:p] < [&o] v [li:[Vu]9(u)]. 
However, the tuple Ii of elements of M belongs to the first, but does not belong to 
either the second or the third subobject when interpreted in M; the first two of these 
facts hold because the choice of p and o; the third because of the hypothesis in (6.4). 
This is a contradiction. l-J 
Let us make the connection between the concept of V’-formula of Section 5 and that 
of A-standard model. By an VA-formula, we mean one over the language LH, with 
A c LH the set of objects fixed above. If 9(Z) is a VA-formula, then we have its internal 
meaning [Z-:9] E S([ZJ); this uses the Heyting structure of H to the extent that that 
structure is assumed in the definition of “A E A distributive”; 9 is not necessarily 
coherent. I claim that an A-standard model M E Mod(H) preserves the meaning of 9: 
M([Z:9]) = M(29); (6.6) 
here, the latter expression is the meaning of the formula 9 in full first-order logic over 
LH in the L,-structure M. The proof is by induction on the complexity of 9. For 
atomic 9, as well as for those obtained by coherent operations, the inductive steps are 
obvious. The only remaining case is when 9 :=: VUI), u:A E A. But, with X = [Z], 
@ = [&$I, rr: A x X + X the product projection, we have 
MW:91) = MW,r@), 
and 
M(29) - (2 E M(X): Vu E M(A). M b $[a, 31) 
= (3 E M(X): Va E M(A). (a, 2’) E M(Q)}, 
the last equality being the induction hypothesis; the desired equality (6.6) follows from 
(6.3). Let us note that the left-in-right inclusion in (6.6) is always true, without the 
A-standardness assumption on M. 
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The last-stated fact enables us to restate Proposition 5.1. Let us emphasize that 
“M E Mod(H) is special” means that the L,-structure M is special in the sense of 
Section 5; thus, this concept refers to the full first-order logic over L,. 
Lemma 6.4. Suppose M, N are A-special models of H, MA-standard, X E H, x E M(X), 
y E N(X), and for each @ E S(X), x E M(G) implies y E N(Q). Then there is an A- 
surjective map h: M + N such that h,(x) = y. 
Proof. As we noted in Section 5, it follows that the L,, u {x)-structures (M, x), (N, y) 
are I-special themselves. With any &-formula q(x) over L,, u {x}, we have 
@ = [x:cp] E S(X); (M, x) k q(x) * x E M(Q) =P y E N(Q) * (N, y) I= q(x), where the 
first and third implications are by the remarks preceding the lemma. Thus, (M, x) and 
(N, y) satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 5.1. The conclusion follows. 0 
Lemma 6.5. Every M E Mod(H) of cardinality 61 has a pure special A-standard 
extension in Mod(H). 
Proof. By Lemma 6.3, M has a pure A-standard extension N of power <A. By the 
existence theorem for special structures (see Section 5), there is a I-special N’ which is 
an elementary extension of N. Since N’ = N, N’ is A-standard as well (see the remark 
following (6.3’) above). An elementary extension is clearly a pure extension; and the 
composite of two pure maps is pure. N’ is the desired extension of M. 0 
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let us choose and fix any A> #inf(H). We take K to be the 
subcategory of Mod(H) whose objects are the A-special A-standard models of H, and 
whose arrows are the A-surjective maps between the latter. Thus, the last requirement 
on e holds true. The fact that e is conservative follows from the fact that H has enough 
models of power <I (which, in turn, is a consequence of the Godel completeness 
theorem, and the downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem), and from Lemma 6.5. Let 
us see that e is (conditionally) Heyting. According to (3.5), we need to have the 
following: given M c K, X 2 Y E H, @ E S(X) and y E M(Y) - M(Vl(@)) (assuming 
Vf(@) exists), there are h: M + N in K and XE N(X) - N(Q) such that 
hy( y) = (Nf) (x). With the given data, consider the following set of L,u (x)-sentences: 
E :f ~HU { Y(f(x)): Y E S(Y), Y E W’Y)} u {~!W>. 
If B were not consistent, by taking a finite meet of Y’s, we would have Y E S(Y) such 
that y E M(Y) and [x:Y(f(x))] < [x:9(x)], that is,f*(Y) i @; hence also Y < VJ(@); 
however, this contradicts y E M(Y) and y#M(Vf(@)). Thus, Z is consistent; it has 
a model, say (N,, x0), of cardinality </2. By Lemma 6.5, let (N, x) be a A-special 
A-standard model of H purely extending (NO, x0). Then, by inspecting 8, we see that 
(N, x) is a model of 8. Also, N E K. By the definition of E, we have that M and N satisfy 
the hypotheses of Lemma 6.4, with y and (Nf)x playing the roles of x and y, 
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respectively. Hence, there is h: A4 + N E K such that by(y) = (N!)(x). Also by the 
definition of E, x E N(X) - N(Q). This completes the proof that e is Heyting. 
The proof that e is coHeyting is similar. Now, we have M E K, @, Y E S(X), Y\@ 
exists, and x E M(Y \@); and we want h : N + M E K with y E N(Y) - N(Q) such that 
h,(y) = x. We let 
2 = C,U(-I~(X): I- E S(X), x~M(~)}u{'f(x),1cD(x)}. 
If Z were inconsistent, we would have r E S(X) with x4 M(T) such that 1, I= 1 c(x) 
* 1 Y(x) v g(x), i.e., C, \ Y(x) * c(x) v @J(X), that is, Y < r v @; as a consequence, 
!@\@ < r, which contradicts x ;M(Y\@) and x$M(r). As before, any I-special 
A-standard (N, y) satisfying B will do what we want. This completes the proof of the 
theorem. 17 
Before we give a version of the theorem for “modal logic”, we clarify what happens 
in the relevant standard structures. Let cp :J+ K be a functor, (p* : Set’ -+ SetJ the 
corresponding premodal structure; let A E Set’ be a componentwise surjective func- 
tor; hence, in particular, A is a distributive object in SetK. It immediately follows that 
q*(A) = A 0 cp is also componentwise surjective (in Set’), since all components of 
q*(A) are components of A. Hence, as our first conclusion, we see that q*(A) is 
a distributiue object in SetJ. But also, considering the equalities 
!+?tK L+ SetJ (J)+ Set = setK cqJ) , set, 
one for each J E J, with (J) the projection, we see each (p* 0 (J) preserves Vz, for any 
product projection A x X + X, hence, since the (J) form a conservative family, ‘p* 
itselfpreseroes Vn’,; this is our second conclusion. The two conclusions lead us to make 
the assumptions of the following theorem, which is, in fact, a generalization of 
Theorem 6.2, from one category to two (take ( )’ of the next theorem to be an identity 
functor to get the previous result). 
Theorem 6.6. Assume that ( )‘: H + D is a coherent finctor between small coherent 
categories, A is a set of distributive objects in H satisfying thefollowing two conditions: 
(a) for each A E A, A is distributive in D; 
(b) each A E A is a Burcan object for . 
Then there are subcategories J, K of Mod(D), Mod(H), respectively, such that the 
inducedfunctor .* : Mod(D) -+ Mod(H) restricts to a functor cp : J + K, both components 
of the evaluation morphism 
D 2% SetJ 
T TV* 
H---t Set’ 
eli 
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satisfy Theorem 6.2, in particular, they are conservative; and 
e = (eD,eH) is conditionally S4 and coS4. 
Proof. NOW, let US take I 3 max( # inr(D)y # inr(H)). We define K and J similarly to 
Kas in the previous theorem: Jis the subcategory of Mod(D) with objects the A-special 
k-standard models of D, with k = {A: A E A), and with morphisms the k-surjective 
arrows; K similarly for H, but making sure that we use the same A. Because of 
assumption (b), we obviously have that for M E Mod(D) k-standard, M/H = A4 0 ( ) 
is A-standard; thus, q is indeed well-defined on objects. The fact that * 
takes an A-surjective arrow to an A-surjective one is clear; hence, cp is well-defined on 
arrows. 
Assumption (a) says that all objects in k are distributive (in D). Since K and J are 
chosen here for H and D, resp., as K is in the proof of Theorem 6.2, it follows that eH, e, 
satisfy the conclusions of that theorem. It remains to verify the biS4 character of e. 
To deal with q according to (3.14), we let X E H, Qi E S(8), q @ E S(X), M E K, 
x E M(X) - M(o@); we want N E J and h: 44 -+ N rH such that h,(x)#N(@) (note 
that N(Q) c N(X) = (N rH)(X)). To this end, consider the set 
E = c,u(y(x): YE S(X), x E M(Y))U(l~(X)) (x:X) 
of sentences over LD u {x}. Suppose E is inconsistent; hen, Y < @ for some Y E S(X) 
such that x E M(Y); thus, Y < q @, which contradicts x E M(Y) and x$M(o@); B is 
consistent. By also using Lemma 6.5, let (N, y) be an A-standard /l-special model of E. 
Then, (N/H, y) is an A-standard A-special model of H. Notice that the hypotheses of 
Lemma 6.4 are satisfied, with (M, x) and (N/H, y) as M and N, resp; this is ensured by 
the fact that (N, y) satisfies the middle term of E. Thus, by Lemma 6.4 we get h as 
desired; hx(x)$N(@) is also part of E. 
Next, we turn to o; see (3.15). Let X E H, Q, E S(8), O@ E S(X), x E M(o@); we want 
N E J, h : N rH + A4 and y E N(G) c N(X) such that h,(y) = x. Consider the set 
E = z,u {1 P(x): Y E S(X), x$M(Y)} u {9(x)}; x:x. 
Suppose 3 is LD u(x)-inconsistent; then @ d Y for some Y E S(X) such that x$M(Y); 
thus, o@ < Y, which contradicts x E M(o@) and x#M(Y); E is consistent. The rest of 
the proof is as in the previous proof for o. 0 
We draw conclusions from Theorems 6.2 and 6.6 for four (families of) doctrines that 
are introduced next; with the natural forgetful functors, they form the following 
diagram: 
B-biS4- B-S4 
I\/ 
B-biH - B-H 
(6.7) 
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Here B is a fixed abstract set; we could once and for all fix it to be N, and we would get 
all the cases of interest. If B = 0, we get the doctrines of Section 3; what we say below 
will complete the proofs of the assertions made in Section 3. We start by defining B-H. 
A B-Heyting category (B -kH) is a Heyting category H together with a map 
B + ) HI that maps every B E B to a distributive object in H. The B-Heyting categories 
form the doctrine (bicategory) B-H. An arrow (h, z):(B 5 H) + (B’ %H’) in B-H is 
a Heyting functor H -+ H’ making the triangle 
HAH’ 
b 
2 
v 
” z:hbgb 
B 
commute up to the specified isomorphism 1. A 2-cell v : (h, I) + (h’, f), both arrows 
(h, l), (h’, I’) from (B % H) to (B’ % H’), is any v : h 2 h’ compatible with the l’s; that is, 
hbYb-h’b 
(Usually, all those isomorphisms are identities.) 
B-biH is defined similarly; now, the H and the h are to be biHeyting. The condition 
on the objects bB in the image of B is now equivalent to saying that each z*, 7c 
a product projection 71: (bB) x X + X, preserves \. The standard objects in B-H as well 
as B-biH are the ones of the form B + SetK, K any small category, with each B E B 
mapped to a componentwise surjective functor. 
A B-S4 category is an S4 category (H 1, D) with an indexing map b : B -+ ) H) such 
that, for every BE B, we have that . preserves Vz for all product projections 
n : (bB) x X -+ X, that is, such that every bB (B E B) is a Barcan object (see Section 4). 
As we know (4.23), it follows that bB is a distributive object in H. The doctrine B-S4 is 
defined in the (by now) obvious way; we have a forgetful functor B-S4 -+ S4. What we 
said in the penultimate sentence tells us that we have a forgetful functor B-S4 -+ B-H 
as well; this is the right vertical in (6.7). 
The specification of B-bi-S4 is clear. Now, the condition on the objects bB in the 
image of B is equivalent to saying that each 7c*, 7c a product projection 
71: (bB) x X + X, commutes with O. 
The structures of the form B + SetK ’ -_* SetlK1, with an arbitrary (small) category K, 
p the canonical “restriction”, and all B E B mapped to componentwise surjective 
functors, are the standard B-S4 as well as the standard B-biS4 categories. 
Theorem 6.7. In each doctrine in (6.7), the named standard objects are small-represmt- 
ative. 
Proof. For B-H and B-biH, the result is imfnediate from Theorem 2. For B-S4 and 
B-biS4, note that the assumption (a) of Theorem 6.6 are satisfied for any object in 
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B-(bi)S4; in a Boolean category, every object is distributive. Condition 6.6(b) is built 
into the definition of B-(bi)S4. Now, the result follows from Theorem 6.6, just like 
(3.22) did from (3.13); note that, in (3.19), obviously, t* maps every componentwise 
surjective functor to another such. 
Corollary 6.8. The enrichments along the forgetfulfunctors in (6.7) are all conservative. 
In particular, there is a faithful interpretation of intuitionistic logic with the axiom of 
constant domains required for quantijcation over selected sorts, in S4 modal logic with 
Barcan’s formula required for quanti$cation over the same sorts. 
7. Constant and variable sets 
Let K be a (small) category; the functor-(presheaf-)category SetK, a Grothendieck 
topos, is an often cited example for a universe of variable sets. The domain of 
variations is K an object of SetK, a functor K + Set is a set variable, or parametrized, 
over K. The Kripke/Joyal theory of intuitionistic and modal logic uses this kind of 
universe of variable sets to model these logics. We distinguish the constant sets among 
the variable ones, and ask what logical properties the constant ones have in relation to 
the general variable ones. The constant sets, among the variable ones, are the constant 
functors: those of the form A(S): K + Set, with S E Set, for which A(S)(K) = S and 
A(S)(k) = ls for all K E K and k E Arr(K). In fact, we have an obvious functor 
A : Set + SetK picking out the constant functors in Set! A is a coherent functor from 
a Boolean category into a Heyting category. Can we say more? The crucial observa- 
tion is that 
for every f E Arr(Set), A(f) is stably distributive in SetK. 
Let us formulate the last assertion slightly more generally. Consider a functor 
cp: K + G, and assume that G is a groupoid. Then we have the induced functor 
q*: SetG + SetK, and Set’ is Boolean. Our first context had G = 1, the terminal 
category. Then, under the above conditions, 
for every f E Arr(SetG), cp*( f) is stably distributive in Set? 
Indeed, the assertion includes that for each object A in Set’, q*(A) is distributive in 
SeP; this follows from the fact q*(A) is componentwise surjective (in fact, it is 
componentwise bijective) (see Observation 6.1). Given that Set’ is Boolean, the 
assertion follows from (4.16). 
We have a doctrine at our hands, to be called the doctrine of constant vs. variable 
sets, a particular locally finitely presentable 2-category, denoted CV-H. An object 
(B i H) of CV-H, a CT/-Heyting category, is given by a Boolean category B, a Heyting 
category H, and a coherent (hence, also Heyting) functor ( ) such that, for every 
g E Arr(B), 4 is a stably distributive arrow in H. A morphism (B i H) -+ (B’ 4 H’) in 
the doctrine is, naturally, a pair (F : B + B’, G : H + H’) of Heyting functors, together 
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with a specified isomorphism 8, making the square 
Hy+ H’ 
.T a \. (7.1) 
B -r+ B’ 
commute up to the isomorphism 8 (most of the time, 0 will be the identity). To 
complete the definition of the doctrine, 2-cells are taken to be appropriate pairs of 
natural isomorphisms. 
The arrow (7.1) is conservative if both F and G are conservative. 
Our (d : Set + SetI), or more generally, the cp* :Set’ + SetK above, are objects of 
CV-H. 
In the definition above of “CV-Heyting category”, requiring additionally the 
category H and the morphism G to be biHeyting gives the notion “CV-biHeyting 
category” and the doctrine CV-biH. The structures ingled out last are in CV-biH as 
well. Notice that in the definition of a CV-biH category, the condition of distributivity 
is equivalent o saying that for every f~ Arr(B), f* preserves coimplication ( \). 
The main result in this section is the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.1. The class of objects of the form (A : Set + SetK), with K any small 
category, is (small-)representative in CV-H, as well as in CV-biH. That is, for any 
CV-(bi)Heyting-category IJ = (B i H) there are a small set I, small categories (in fact, 
preorders) Pi (i E I), and a conservative CV-(bi)Heyting map 
H-+ Setup8 
-1 = Tn,,+ 
B --+ Set’ 
First, a slight variant. 
Theorem 7.1’. For any small CV-(bi)Zf object IJ = (B i H), there are q :K -+ G, 
a functor into a groupoid, and a conservative CV-(bi)H morphism 
b H (cp* : SetG + Sef). 
Proof of Theorem 7.1’. Let A denote the set {B: B E B} of objects in H, each A E A is 
distributive. By Theorem 6.2, we have a subcategory K of Mod(H) such tha; the 
evaluation eH: H + SetK is conservative, (bi)Heyting, and for all A E A and M + N, 
h, is a surjective function. We claim that each hA is in fact bijective. The reason is that 
with A = 8, =B E S(B x B) has a Boolean complement Ze (in B), and thus 
=A E S(A x A) has a Boolean complement # A = ( z~)‘; since hA preserves #a (use 
the component h fA), it follows that hA is injective. Let G be the groupoid Mod*(B) of 
all models of B; composition with . defines a (reduct) functor .* : K + G. We have the 
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commutative square 
H-% SetK 
./ I... 
B --+ SetG 
ee 
of functors where e, is also an evaluation; it is conservative (see (3.2)). This proves the 
theorem. 17 
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Let us start with the data given by Theorem 7.1’. By (3.7), let 
P be a tree (bush), and p : P --) K be upward (two-way) surjective. Observe the fact that 
cp 0 p : P + G as any functor from a bush into a groupoid is isomorphic to a functor 
constant on connected components. In fact, with Z the set of connected components of 
P, with $ : P + Z the quotient map, and with 6’: Z -+ G defined by putting 0(i) = cp( pi) 
for i E Z with pi any selected element of the component i, we have that I : cp 0 p z 0 0 I); 
1 will exist because in any component i = [pi] = [p], there is a unique reduced path 
from pi to p; in fact, 1 is uniquely determined once its components zP, are (arbitrarily) 
fixed, for all i E I. Modify Z by adding elements to it to make 0 surjective an objects. 
We have the square 
K-PP 
rp 1 e I* 
Gy-Z 
which gives rise, by (3.6) to the conservative CV-(bi)H morphism 
SetK ----f SetP 
T z i 
SetG-+ Set1 
Note that the CV-biHeyting object Setr -+ SetP is isomorphic to the product of the 
di: Set -+ SetPI (i E I, with Pi the fiber over i, empty if i is an “additional” element). 
Composing the CV-(bi)H map given in Theorem 7.1’ with the last one gives the 
desired CV-(bi)H map. 0 
To complete the picture, let us mention CV-S4 and CV-biS4 categories. A CV- 
(bi)S4 category is a structure of the form B i H 5 D consisting of objects and 
morphism of Coh in which B is Boolean, H ?-+ D E (bi) S4, and in which for all arrows 
fin B, Vi satisfies Barcan’s formula (see (4.20)). In the CV-biS4 case, the last condition 
is to say that o is substitutive with respect o substitutions along arrows f, f~ Arr(B). 
The definitions of the doctrines CV-S4 and CV-biS4 are as expected. The standard 
objects in CV-(bilS4 are the ones of the form Set “+ SetKlli SeF. The four 
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CV-doctrines are connected by forgetful functors: 
CV-biS4-p-+ CV-S4 
I\ 1 
CV-biH ---+ CV-H 
(7.2) 
Theorem 7.2. In each doctrine in (7.2), the designated standard objects are small- 
representative. As a consequence, each jiunctor (7.2) gives its domain as a conservative 
enrichment of the codomain. 
The result is related to the completeness theorem for S4 predicate logic with 
constant domains; see [13, 9.8, p. 1761. In [19, 4.13, p. 3531, is a related result, with 
more structure in the logic, and with explicit topos-theoretic semantics. In both 
sources, symbolic logic is interpreted via Kripke semantics, resp. in categories, and 
traditional proof-systems are used. Since in both of these contexts, “all sorts are 
constant”, or, translated into our context, every object is a subobject of a constant 
object (compare (3.23)), the proofs of these earlier variants of our result are essentially 
easier. On this last point, see also Section 9. 
8. Theories satisfying Lawvere’s condition 
We start by introducing 
functors: 
L-biS4--+ L-S4 
111 
L-biH ---+ L-H 
a square of four doctrines, with connecting forgetful 
(8.1) 
The objects of L-H, resp. L-biH, are the Heyting, resp. biHeyting, categories atisfying 
Lawvere’s condition (L) (see Section 4): for each product projection rr, Vz is distribu- 
tive. Arrows and 2-cells are as in H, resp biH: e.g., L-H is a full and 2-full subbicategory 
of H. The objects of L-S4 are the S4 categories (a: H + D) in which . preserves vz for all 
roduct projections 7~ in H, that is, all objects are Barcan; the arrows and 2-cells of L-S4 
are those of S4: L-S4 is a full and 2-full subbicategory of S4. By (4.23), as a conse- 
quence, each YX is distributive (in H; in other words, the axiom of constant domains 
holds for V,J; it follows that the mapping (. : H + D) H H defines a forgetful functor 
L-S4 + L-H. L-biS4 is defined in the expected manner; note that by (4.17) the,(new) 
condition is the same as that o be invariant under substitution along product 
projections. The main result of this section is the following theorem. 
Theorem 8.1. The enrichments along the forgetful jiinctors in (8.1) are all conservative. 
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As before, we deduce this result from appropriate completeness theorems. The 
completeness results are no longer of “Kripke-type”; the target categories are not 
presheaf categories. However, they are still Grothendieck toposes, in fact prime- 
generated (see Section 3) ones. The main tool is the first author’s construction of the 
“topos of types”, a categorical generalization of the “prime-generated hull” explained 
in the first section. Another tool is an embedding theorem due to the authors of this 
paper (in their [29]), which is a sharpening of M. Barr’s Boolean embedding theorem 
for Grothendieck toposes. Considering the completeness theorems of this section 
merely as tools to show the result of Theorem 8.1, a statement of pure logic, one still 
sees how essential the use of toposes are. For instance, the adjoints necessary to 
produce the right structures in the target categories are given by basic properties of 
Grothendieck toposes stemming from their inJinitary structure. 
Theorem 8.2. Let H be a small L-Heyting category. Then there is a prime-generated 
(hence, bihleyting) Grothendieck topos 6’ satisfying condition (L) and a conservative, 
Heyting and conditionally coHeyting functor H -+ b. 
d will be constructed as the topos of types of H introduced in [26]. We now recall 
the definition and the properties needed. 
For a while, let H denote an arbitrary small coherent category. 
Let X E H. A Jilter on X is a set F c S(X) of subobjects of X closed under finite 
intersection (in particular, lx E F) and closed upward. The set of filters on X is 
denoted 9(X). For F E 9(X), and f: X + Y, If(F) is defined to be 
3,(F) zf (B E S(Y): f*B E F) c S(Y); 
it is immediate that 3/(F) is a filter on Y. Suppose B is a coherent category in which 
the subobject lattices are complete; e.g., d is a Grothendieck topos. A p-model of H in 
d is any model M in 8 (a coherent functor M : H + 8) satisfying 
M )= A Bdy) F 3~ A (f(x) =r Y * A(x)) (8.2) 
Bd,F Ad 
for all X 5 Y E Hand F E F(X). p-Mod8(H) denotes the category of all p-models of 
H in 8; p-Mod,(H) is a full subcategory of Mod,(H). 
A A-geometric functor between Grothendieck toposes is a geometric functor (the 
inverse image part of a geometric morphism) preserving, in addition, all intersections 
of subobjects; A-geo(d, 9) denotes the category of all A-geometric functors d + 9; 
A-geo(b, 9) is a full subcategory of geo(b, 4t). Any p-model M : H + d induces, by 
composition, a functor 
M* : //-geo(8, F) + p-Mod,(H). (8.3) 
The topos of types, or prime-generated hull, I of H is defined as a prime-generated 
Grothendieck topos d with a p-model M :H + d satisfying the following universal 
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property: for any prime generated Grothendieck topos 8, M* in (8.3) is an equiva- 
lence of categories. We write F(H) for the topos of types of H, and 
for the canonical p-model of Hin F(H). In [26], the existence and various properties 
of the topos of types are proved; the definition through a universal property ensures 
the uniqueness of the topos of types up to an equivalence. Note that the fact that .* is 
an equivalence contains the statement hat for any M E p-Mod,(H) there is ii?i E A- 
geo(F(H), 9) unique up to isomorphism, such that 
commutes up to isomorphism. As usual, the construction of . : H -+ F(H) can be 
arranged so that the last diagram is strictly commutative, that is, 
fio( )‘= M; 
we will use this below, although it should be emphasized that this is done only for 
a simplification in notation. 
We note that a &-saturated (see Section 5) model of H is a p-model in Set. Indeed, 
with the notation for (8.2), if M E Mod(H), y E M(Y) with y E M(B) for all B E 3,-(F), 
then the set {f(x) = y} u {A(x): A E F} is finitely satisfiable in M: the second term of 
the union is closed under finite conjunction, and if A E: F, then M k 3x(f(x) = 
y A ,4(x)), since for B =r b E Y: 3x(f(x) =y A A(x))], we have f*B = A. Together 
with the existence theorem for &-saturated models, this observation shows, among 
others, that H has “enough p-models”, that is, 
. : H -+ F(H) is conservative. 
With X E H, a Jilter-subobject of X is any subobject of 8 which is the intersection of 
subobjects of the form k, A E S(X) in H; a filter-object P of F(H) is one which is the 
domain of a monomorphism m : P H 2 giving rise to a filter-subobject [m]. We have 
that 
the set ofjlter-objects generate F(H) 
in the sense used in theory of Grothendieck toposes; this is used to reduce assertions 
about objects in F(H) to filter-objects. 
For any X E H, the induced mapping. : S(X) -+ S(2) satisjies the universal property 
of the canonical map of S(X) into its prime-generated hull. 
This follows from (1.8) in [26] and (2.8). [(2.8)(ii) is lot. cit. (iii); (i) is contained in lot. 
cit. (i); to see (iii), assume A\ierli < J; take the filter F generated by the xi; assuming 
that x#F, by the prime filter existence theorem, there is a prime p with F c p, but x#p; 
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but also, with the notation of loc.cit., A (a(A): A E p} < ~iEI pi < i, and by loc.cit. (iii) 
and (ii), x E p, contradiction. (iv) is contained in loc.cit. (i).] 
In particular, we are going to freely use for .: S(X) --f S(X) the properties of the 
prime-generated hull listed in (2.8). 
Let us show that 
-: H + F(H) is conditionally Heyting and coHeyting. 
Suppose f:X + Y in H, A E S(X) and Vf;A E S(Y) exists. Let @E S(X). Since 
f*(VfA)’ < k, the left-to-right direction in 
is clear. To show the converse, first note that the required property for C#J = Vicl pi is 
inherited from the same for the @;s. Thus, it suffices to deal with @ a filter-subobject, 
@ = A\iar Bi. Then, f*@ = A\ierf*Bi;f*@ < k implies that, for some finite I’ c I, 
A,f*Bi =f* A Bi ( ) ’ < k iel’ 
and f*( A\icr* Bi) < A. Thus, l\isl’ Bi < Vf A, from which 45 < (Vf A)’ follows. 
Since S(X) is the prime-generated hull of S(X), the fact that . is conditionally 
coHeyting, referring as it does to propositional ogic only, is contained in the fact that 
the canonical embedding of a distributive lattice into its prime-generated hull is 
conditionally coHeyting; see (2.6). 
Lemma 8.3. Let 6 be a biHeyting Grothendieck topos, 3 a generating set of objects in 
8. Assume that for every A, B E 9, the projection I(: A x B + B is distributive. Then 
8 satis$es (L): all product projections X x Y -+ Y are distributive. 
Proof. We place ourselves in a Grothendieck topos b. Let us quote two formulas from 
[29]; both concern the expression of V,, for f: A + B, by other universal quantifiers. 
The first uses a cover (epimorphic family) (Ai 011 A)ie, of A, the other a cover 
(BiB’ B)i,l of B. We have, for any @ E S(A), 
and, with reference to the pullback squares 
ALB 
1, T T 0 Bi ) 
AiT Bi 
Vf(@) = v 3j%vf,q @ isl 
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(see 6.1.6., p. 170 and 6.1.7., p. 172 in [29]). The formulas are not too hard to verify 
directly. 
Turning to the proof of the lemma, consider first n : X x B + I? with I3 E 4e (and 
arbitrary X). By assumption, there is a cover (~$2 A)jEI of X with Ai E B(i E I). 
Then the composite in the following is a projection itself, for a product of objects in 9: 
AixB=% XxB> B=AixBL_, B; 
and (A~x B- “xB+ X x B)i,l is a cover of X x B. We calculate, with @ E S(B), 
Y E S(X x B), 
V,Jn*@ v Y) = A Vnll(ai x B)*(Tc*@ v Y) (by the first formula) 
is1 
= ? Vri(~r@ v (ai x B)* Y’) 
= b (CD v Vn,(ai x B)*Y) (by Zi distributive) 
= @ v A t/,,(ai x B)* Y (since 8 is biHeyting, 
icl 
@ v ( ) preserves A) 
= @ v Vz Y (by a second application of the 
first formula), as desired. 
Next, to the general case. Start with n :X x Y + Y, and a cover (BiL Y )ic, with 
Bi E $9; let Qi E S(Y), Y E S(X x Y). We have the pullbacks 
XXYIIY 
ai=Xxa.T q Ipi, 
XxB,- Bi 
7% 
VA?T*@ v Y) = /I 3p,Vn,a*(7r*@ v Y) = V 3B,Vn,(~Tj3*Qj v a*Y) 
ioZ is1 
= V 3p,(fi*@ V VniCt* Y) = V (Elaiflr@ v 3piVT,a~ Y) 
is1 ioZ 
= V 3p,fl*@ v V 3,Vn,a: Y 
iel is1 
= @v V laiVn,a* Y = @ v ‘J,Y; 
is1 
we used the fact that the pi cover Y in inferring Vie, $&+QD = @. 17 
Consider . : H + Y(H). 
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Lemma 8.4. Suppose H is a Heyting category that satisfies (L). Then in f(H),jior any 
jilter-objects P and Q, n : P x Q + Q is distributive. 
Proof. Considering the pullback 
PxY- Y 
PxQ- Q 
with an appropriate mono Q H I’, and remembering (4.6) that distributivity of the 
lower horizontal is inherited from that of the upper one, we see that it suffices to 
consider n: P x f + f with Y E H. Let X E H, U E S(8) a filter-subobject such that 
n=[PZZ]. Let @ES(Y), rcS(PxIi); we let Y =3,.~rES(XxY); among 
others, r = (m x I’)*!#‘. We desire to show that Vn(n*@ v r) <f @v V*‘,r. Since d is 
prime-generated, this is equivalent o saying that for all primes q E Pr(S(Y)), 
4 ~q7t*er) => 4 +dhvnr; 
since q is prime, q < @v VJ o q G @ or q < VJ. Also, since 
q<fvxr 0 n*qGPx.r 0 nxq<kxpy 
and 
we can rewrite the aimed-at implication as 
l7xq <m,fIlx@v!P * q <f@ or llxq <k,f Y. 
Let us fix q E Pr( I’) and assume 
IZxq <m,pllx@v!P, q &@ and IZxq Gxf!P (8.4) 
to derive a contradiction. It follows that there is M E p-Mod(H) such that 
A(U x q) <a(Y); that is, there are x E M(X) (=A?@)) and y E M(Y) such that 
x E &f(n) and y E j@(q), but (x, y)#G(Y). We claim that 
there are N E p-Mod(H) and a pair (a,$) of elements i E m(fI) and y^ E m(q) such 
that (2, y*)#fi(Y), and in addition, y^ is generic for q, that is, for any 
B E S(Y), 9 E N(B) iff q < B. 
TO show the claim, we let Y = ViEr A\jsJ,Cij, with appropriate Cij E S(X x Y). We 
have for every i E I some ji E Ji such that (x, y)$M(Ciji) (since fi respects A). 
Consider the following set of sentences over the language LHu {x,~} (x: X, y : Y): 
C,u {B(J): q <f B} u {-I@(J): q +* d} u {ic,i,(x,y): i E Z} u {A(x): Zl <k A}. 
(8.5) 
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We claim it is consistent. Suppose not. The second and fifth terms of the union are 
clearly closed under finite conjunction (up to equivalence in T,,). The same is true of 
the third term because q is prime. We have B,DES(Y),AES(X) with 
q <f &q &d, I7 Q A and a finite subset I’ of I such that, for 
C = Vi.l’ Ci, E S(X x Y), we have 
T, I- BOr\lDOr\lC(x,y)~/I(x) $ 1, 
that is, 
TH I- A(x)~Bdy) z 4Y.v)~ C(w). (8.5’) 
Note that the choice of the ji ensures that (x, y)#M(C). 
Let A = [U AX]. With p: U x Y --) Y the projection, E = (n x Y)*C E S(U x Y), 
(8.5’) says that 
p*(B) Gux Y P*@ v E. 
Hence, 
B <<y VJp*(D) v E) = D v VP(E), 
the last equality because of(L) for H. Since q < h, we obtain 
q by d v (VP(E))’ = b v I$@), 
the last equality because. is Heyting. However, q is a prime and q $y d. It follows that 
q Q? V&E), which is to say that p*(q) <c,l; l?, and equivalently, k xq Q~,P c. 
However, this last is contradicted by M, x and y: x E A(k), y E h?(q) and 
(?I, y)$fi(C). This contradiction proves the consistency of (8.5). 
Let (N, $9) be an &-saturated model of (8.5). Then N is a p-model. Since q, II are 
filter-subobjects, the second and fifth terms in (8.5) ensure that 9 E m(q), 2 E m(n). 
The third term makes 9 generic for q. Finally, the fourth term ensures that 
(x, y)#fl(Y). We have proved the claim. 
Armed with the data as in the claim, we return to (8.4) and derive a contradiction. 
We have @ = //isI AjeJ, B,, for suitable Bij E S(Y). q $@ means that for every i E I 
there isji E Ji such that q $Biji. Since 9 is generic for q, y*# N(Bij;) for all i E I. But then 
j#n(@) (fl respects V). Looking at the first condition in (8.4), and the facts that 
(2, E> E R(n x q), G, y^)$R(fl x @), we conclude ($9) E N(Y), contradicting the 
last-mentioned property of (12, 9) in the claim. 0 
Proof of Theorem 8.2. The theorem follows, with H + &’ taken to be . : H + F(H), by 
the properties, listed above, of the topos of types, and the two lemmas. 0 
Proof of Theorem 8.1 (first part). First of all, note that the “conservative nrichment” 
character of the lower horizontal in (8.1) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 8.2: 
6 E L-biH. 
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Turning to other parts of (8.1), let us quote a result, Theorem 6.2.1, slightly restated 
(weakened) from [29]: 
Any Grothendieck topos has a conservative geometric embedding into a Boolean 
Grothendieck topos preserving all stably distributive infs of subobjects and all 
stably distributive Qr’s. (8.6) 
Here, a particular inf Ai. Ai of subobjects Ai E S(X) is distributive if for any A E S(X), 
A v A\iel Ai = Aict(A v Ai); it is stably distributive if for any f: Y -+ X, the inf 
A\ietf*AiE S(Y) d’ b is istri utive. It turns out that, in a Grothendieck topos, one can 
write any inf as a suitable Qf(@), and then (stable) distributivity of the inf becomes the 
same as that of the Qf(@); thus, in fact, in the quote the reference to infs is not needed. 
However, in our use of the quoted result, the uses of the two mentioned istributivities 
are separate. 
Let H E L-(bi) H; we need some (cp :8 H 93) E L-biS4 and a conservative (bi)Heyting 
functor . :H- 6’; this will establish the conservative character of the enrichments 
along the two verticals and the diagonal in (8.1). We let . :I?+-+ 8 be the embedding 
given by Theorem 8.2. Since d is prime-generated, and as a consequence, all subobject 
lattices in &’ are coframes, all infs are distributive in 6. By Theorem 8.2, for every 
product projection n, Qx is (stably) distributive in B. Therefore, (8.6) is applicable to 
obtain a geometric embedding cp :B H.@ into a Boolean topos 5g preserving all infs 
and all Qz’s (?t projection). For any X E B, cpx :S(X) + S((pX) preserves all infs; hence, 
rp, has a left adjoint ox : S((pX) + S(X). As a geometric functor, cp itself has a right 
adjoint; thus, in particular, also a local right adjoint (see Section 3). We have that 
(cp: &HS?) is a biS4 category. Since all Qz’s are distributive in d as given by 
Theorem 8.2, (v:&‘H~) is in fact in L-biS4. 0 
The proof of the remaining case of Theorem 8.1 requires a completeness theorem 
for L-S4. We prove a result of a greater generality. 
Theorem 8.5. Let (cp : H + D) E Coh with H E H such that cp preserves all Qe, p a prod- 
uct projection in H. Then the induced functor F(q): F(H) -+ T(D) between the 
prime-generated hulls preserves all Qz, for product projections n in F(H). 
Proof. We are going to use * to denote both cp and y(q), and . for the canonical 
H + F(H), D -, 9-(D). 
In analogy to Lemma 8.3, but more directly, using the two formulas quoted in the 
proof of Lemma 8.3, and using the fact that r(cp) preserves infs, we obtain that it 
suffices to show that r(cp) preserves Qz for projections K: P x Q + Q with P, Q 
filter-objects of 9(H). Further, by an easy argument similar to (4.6), similarly to the 
reduction achieved at the start of the proof of Theorem 8.2, we can replace Q here by 
an object I’, Y E H. Thus, we consider P E F(H), X, Y E H, l7 = [P k _%I, I? a fil- 
ter-subobject, rc : P x I’ + I’ a product projection. Since r(cp) preserves infs, r(cp) has 
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a local left adjoint 0. With a look at the familiar adjunction 
S(P x rr) e-ilf-S(3) S(B x yc) -5 S( y’) 
0 
i I O (8.7) -1 A T T 
,\ 
S(Px t’) TS(Y) S(P x 1’),- S(Y) ’ 
we see that what we need is the commutativity of the left-hand square (8.7). Since all 
maps in (8.7) preserv: V, it suffices to show the equality OS*@ = x*0@ for fil- 
ter-subobjects @ E S(Y). This we do by showing that 7c*o@ has the universal property 
of ofi*@; that is, for any r E S(P x ?), 
Since @ < (o@)~ and x*0@ < r = ri*@ d I?*(o@)~ 6 r^, only the right-to-left im- 
plication requires proof. Assume 
2*@ < i;, 
to show n*o@ < r. 
(8.8) 
Since the models A, for M E p-Mod(H), form a sufficient family of A-geometric 
functors from F(H) to Set, the task is reduced to showing that for any such M, 
@(n*o@) d h?(r). Thus, in addition, we assume M E p-Mod(H), (x, y) E fi(n*&), 
i.e., 
x E A(n) c M(X), 4'~ M(o@)c M(Y) (8.9) 
and we want 
?: (x, y) E A(r). (8.10) 
We are going to construct N E p-Mod(D), 9 E N(g), 9 E N(P) with the following 
properties: 
2 E m(G),, 9 E R(Q) and ($9) E N(c) = (x, y) E M(C) for all C E S(X x Y). 
(8.11) 
Supposing we have (8.11), note that the first two relations in (8.11) say that 
($9) E R(+*@); then, by (8.8), ($9) E R(F). NOW, r_= (HI x S)* ViEI l\jsJi C, for 
suitable Cij E S(X x Y); thus, P = (& x A?)* Vise l\jeJi Cij. It follows that there is i E I 
such that for all j E Ji, (a, $) E N(Cij). By the last relation in (8.1 l), (x, y) E M(C,j) for 
the same i and for all j E Ji, from which (x, y) E M(T), as desired. 
It suffices to satisfy (8.11) . Consider the following set Z of sentences over the 
language L, u {x, u}: 
C&J{&): A E S(X), k 2% II) u{E@): B E S(P), J3 2; @} 
” (%%,Y): R E S(X x Y), <x, y)$M(R)). 
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Using that II and @ are filter-subobjects, if N E p-Mod(D), (N, $9) l= 8, then (8.11) 
holds. It suffices to show that B is consistent; any &-saturated model of it will do. 
Suppose Z fails to be consistent. Since the second, third and fourth terms in the 
union are closed (up to equivalence) under finite conjunction, we then must have 
A E S(X), B E S(Y), and R E S(X x Y) such that 
k a*zI, B 2~ @ and (x, y)$M(R) (8.12) 
and such that 
&t-&x) A B(y) s Q&Y). (8.13) 
Let A = [U A X], p : U x Y + Y the product projection. Then (8.13) is equivalent o 
saying that 
b*B < (n* x P)*R. (8.14) 
Now we use the assumption that ( )” = cp:H+ D preserves all VP, p a product 
projection in H. Thus, for C b VQ(n x Y)*R E S(Y), we have that Vc(n* x Y)*fi exists 
are equals C. From (8.14), we infer B < V&? x Y)*R; thus B < C. Since @ < B G c^ (by 
(8.12)), we obtain o@ < C. By (8.9), it follows that y E M(C); also x E M(A) by 
(8.9), (8.12); equivalently, (x, y) E M(rc:A A K~C); here, X CX x Y 2% Y are the 
product projections. Now, C = b:Vx(& --t j&y)], which makes it clear that 
x:,4 A z:C < R. We conclude (x, y) E M(R), contradicting (8.12). 0 
Corollary 8.6. For (cp :H + D) E H, we have that F(q): F(H) + F(D) is also Heyting 
(in other words, f(q), : F(D) + Y(H) is an open geometric morphism; see e.g. [30]). 
Proof. Note that a functor cp :H + D E Coh, with Heyting categories H, D, is Heyting 
iff it preserves all V,_ 71 a projection, and preserves implications of subobjects. Note 
that S(X), S(X) are the prime-generated hulls of S(X), S(X), resp., and as a conse- 
quence, y(cp) induces the canonical inf-preserving map S(X) + S(X), which, by (2.1 l), 
is Heyting, since ( )” : S(X) + S(T) is. The assertion follows. 0 
The Corollary 8.6 is analogous to a result of A.M. Pitts concerning a construction 
related to 5( ); see Theorem 2.1 in [30]. 
Theorem 8.7. The structures of the form $: d + 23, with 8, B prime-generated 
Grothendieck toposes, $ a conservative A-geometric jiunctor preserving all Vn for 
product projections n in 8, are representative in L-S4 and in L-biS4. 
Proof. Let (cp :H++D) E L-(biIS4. Consider 
(8.15) 
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It is easy to see, and it was pointed out in [26] too, that for 9 Boolean, F(9) is also 
Boolean. As before, let us write ( )^’ for the effect of both cp and f-(q). Since the 
filter-objects generate 9(H), to show that F(cp) is conservative it suffices to show that 
if @, !P are filter-subobjects of 8, X EH, and @ $ Y, then & $ $. We have some 
A E S(X) such that Y < k and @ $A. Therefore, for all B E S(X) such that @ d B, we 
have $ $A, that is, B $ A, and fl $A since cp is conservative. Now, 4 = A (fi: 
B E S(X), Qi < h}. Hence, by the contrapositive of (23)(iii), C$ $i follows; 6 $9 is 
a consequence. 
Given any X E H, on the corresponding subobject lattices, (8.15) reduces to the first 
of the two diagrams: 
S(X)---+ S(X) S(S)- ?+ S(X)** 
,Y T T h h T T A** ,
W)---+ W) S(X) -+s(x)** -X(X, 
which is isomorphic to the second. By (2.18), it follows that (.“, TV) in (8.15) is an arrow 
in (bi)S4. 0 
Proof of Theorem 8.1 (concZusiun). The fact that the upper horizontal in (8.1) is 
a conservative nrichment follows from Theorem 8.7 (for L-S4). 0 
9. Alternative methods for the Kripke-type completeness results 
It is easily seen that the conservative nrichment results depend only on complete- 
ness theorems for countable theories. More specifically, each of our doctrines is locally 
finitely presentable, and thus every object is a filtered colimit of finitely presentable 
objects. Moreover, all our forgetful functors are finitary, that is, preserve filtered 
colimits. Also, a filtered colimit of conservative morphisms is conservative. It is then 
immediate that the fact of the unit of the adjunction being conservative (see (**) in 
Section 2) is inherited from finitely presentable objects to all objects. It is clear that the 
internal theory T,, of a finitely presentable object H, in any of the doctrines, is 
a countable theory; that is, one in a countable language. 
The just stated fact is a justification for a narrowing of interest, common in logic, to 
countable theories; the theorems of “pure logic” will not need theories other than 
countable ones. In this section, we give alternative proofs, valid for countable theories 
only, for some Kripke-type completeness results. Note that the proofs in Section 6 use 
possibly uncountable models (that is, coherent functors to Set from the categories 
involved) even when the categories are countable. Here, we will work with countable 
models only. 
There is a general way of substituting recursively saturated countable models for 
the special models, in case the theories (categories) involved are recursively presented. 
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This substitution does work in our cases without difficulty. Using relative recursive- 
ness (relative to an arbitrary real), this method can be extended to all countable 
theories. We will not elaborate on this; see e.g. [4]. We will point out those cases when 
a method genuinely different from the preceding ones gives a better, that is, more 
canonical, completeness theorem. 
First, we state a version of the omitting types theorem, specifically suited for the 
purposes of coherent logic. The theorem is essentially equivalent o the basic omitting 
types theorem of [14]. To emphasize the naturalness of the present formulation, we 
outline a direct proof of it. 
Throughout this section, the symbol I- is used for a notion of deducibility complete 
for finitary coherent logic. 
Let jr, u’ be finite tuples of distinct variables. A finite tuple 3 of not necessarily 
distinct variables is a copy of.2 in ii if, with jt = (Xi)i<n, iI = (Uj)j<m, we have that 
3 = (Uk)i<n for some ji < m (i < n) (not necessarily distinct jis) such that JJ matches 2, 
i.e., xi and yji are sorted in the same way for each i < n. Thus, in this case, (~33, the result 
of the (proper) substitution of g for x’ (possibly involving passing to an alphabetic 
variant of cp first) is well-formed. 
Let T = (L, C) be a countable coherent theory; we assume T is consistent. Let 
E(Z), T(2) be sets of coherent L-formulas with at most the free variables indicated; x’ is 
a finite string of distinct variables. We are interested in a condition that it sufficient for 
T to be consistent with the following infinitary formula: 
we call such n an infnitary entailment, or simply an co-condition. Also, to be faithful to 
the spirit of the notation so far, we write 
A :=: /j E(Z) z v T(x’). 
An L-structure M meets (satisfies) the condition n if MIA in the normal sense. 
Consider an arbitrary L-entailment I :=: 0 3 v. The condition LC(A, I) on n and 
A is defined to be the following one: 
LC(/1;1). For any copy 3 of St in G, if T HI 8 v v r,” for all 5 E E and 
T t- 8 A rf 3 v for all y E r, then T HI 3 v. 
We say that T is locally consistent with n if LC(A, 2) holds for all coherent L- 
entailments i. 
Proposition 9.1 (Coherent omitting types theorem). Let T be a coherent heory ouer 
the countable language L; assume T is consistent. Let A be a countable set of c+condi- 
tions over L. If each A E A is locally consistent with T, then T has a countable model 
meeting each oo-condition in A. 
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Proof. First, let us formulate a model-existence principle. Suppose X is a countable 
set of variables, each sorted by sorts in L. Let 0 and !2 be (countable) sets of coherent 
formulas, with free variables included in X; we are going to treat free variables as 
individual constants, and accordingly, we call the formulas involved “sentences”. Also, 
all formulas (sentences) are coherent unless otherwise specified. Let us make the 
following assumptions on (X, @,a): 
(i) 0 u(i)!2 is L(X)-consistent 
((1)Q =f (1 cp: CJJ E 52); L(X)-consistency means that there is an L(X)-model for the 
set of sentences in question; note that, because of possibly empty domains, it is not 
true that if a set of sentences is consistent with respect to a language, it remains 
consistent with respect o an extension of the language; the extension may contain an 
individual constant in a sort that was rendered empty by the given axioms; this is why 
the parameter L(X) is mentioned); 
(Okcp means logical consequence with respect o L(X)-models; remember that mem- 
bers of X are individual constants; cp and +, here and below, range over coherent 
L(X)-sentences); 
(iii) Ok3 xcp * there is y E X matching x such that Ok&; 
(iv) (i)Qbi(cp~rl/) * (i)sZPrcp or (i)s2!=7$. 
We claim that, under the hypotheses (i)-(iv), 0 u(l)Q has an L(X)-model in which 
every element is the denotation of some x E X. Indeed, let N be any L(X)-model of 
0 u (1)52, given by (i); consider the subset 1 M) of N whose elements are the denota- 
tions of the constants in X. The set 1 M 1 is closed under the operations of I, as seen by 
an application of (iii). Thus, we may consider the submodel M of N on the set 1 MI. We 
show by induction on the complexity of the L(X)-sentence cp that 01cp * Mhp, and 
(1 )s2 11 cp j Mb cp. For cp atomic, this is clear by the construction of M. If cp :=: t 
or cp :=: f, the assertions are a consequence of(i). For cp :=: $ A 8, the first assertion is 
automatic by induction, and the second follows by (iv) and induction. The remaining 
clauses are treated in a similarly direct manner. The claim is established. 
Now, back to the data of the proposition. Let us fix a countable set X0 of variables 
such that for each sort S of L, there are infinitely may variables in X0 of sort S; all 
variables of all formulas are to be from X0; X, to be named later, will be a subset of 
X,,. An approximation (of a description of a model) is a triple (3 8, v) with the free 
variables in 6’ and v included in ii, and such that T VS z v; 8 is to be true (at the given 
free variables as constants) in the model to be constructed, v to be false. We note the 
following properties (v)-(xi) of this notion; assume throughout that (Z, 8, v) is an 
approximation. 
(v) (0, t, f) is an approximation. By T being consistent. 
(vi) 8 A 1 v is L(d)-consistent. This is direct from the definition of approximation. 
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(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
(x) 
For any formula of the form 40 v + with free variables among the ii, if 
l-8 2 cp v $, then either (Ir, 8 A cp, v), or (iS, 0 A Ic/, v) is an approximation, 
For any formula of the form 3 xcp with free variables among the 8, if l-0 $3 xrp, 
then, for any variable y matching x such that y is not in 3, (Ify, 8~ cp:, v) is an 
approximation. 
For any formula of the form cp A I,+ with free variables among the ii, if 
l-cp A $ 3 v, then either (58, v v rp), or (i&t?, v v rl/) is an approximation. 
Ifcp F$EE((the axioms of the given theory T ), and jJ is a copy of i! in G?, then 
either (3, 8 A t& v), or (3,8, v v cpz) is an approximation. This follows, by con- 
traposition, from the fact (immediately seen, semantically) that 
(ix) ForanyA = AZ z V r E A, and any copy g of Jt in ii, either there is y E r such 
that (Se A yf, v) is an approximation, or there is 5 E B such that (5 6, v v is:) is an 
approximation. This is direct from the condition LC(A, A) for the given A :=: 8 F v. 
We say that the approximation (G’, 8’, v’) extends (J 0, v) if tt?’ z 0 and t-v F v’. 
“Extends” is obviously a transitive relation. We construct a sequence 
(Ui)i<o :=: ((f&7 ei, vi))i<w of approximations uch that cyi+ 1 extends o+ (i < w). We 
put (i&, f+,, v,J = (8, t, f) (see (v)). Each of the conditions (vii)-(xi) gives a (“non- 
deterministic”) closure condition that the construction will meet; the construction will 
consist of steps in which we honor particular instances of the closure conditions. For 
example, corresponding to (xi), it will be true that for any A E A and y as in (xi), there is 
i<~ such that (Iii+l,Bi+l,vi+r) is either (iii, eiA yg, Vi) for some y E r, or 
(iii, ei, Vi v ef) for some < E Z. Or, as another example, for any i < o and cp v $ such 
that i-t+ 2 cp v If/, there will be i <j c w such that either ä j T cp or I-0, $ $, In the 
first case, the construction will use fact (xi); in the second, fact (vii); in the second case, 
j is not necessarily i + 1, but some later stage preassigned by a dovetailing plan. 
Because of the countability assumptions, among others, the countability of A we can 
dovetail all the instances of the closure conditions so that all of them are met. 
We put X to be the set of all variables occurring in some iii, i < co, and define 
0 = {Bi: i -c co}, Sz = {Vi: i < co}. Since the tli are “increasing”, and we have (vi), 
condition (i) holds. Conditions (ii),(iii) and (iv) are consequences of (Cii)icw being 
closed with respect (vii), (viii) and (ix), resp. Thus, we may consider the model 
A4 constructed in our initial claim. 
Closure with respect o (x) ensures that for any axiom cp T $ E Z:, and any tuple JJ of 
not necessarily distinct variables from 97, jJ matching 3, we have that either $f E 0, or 
‘p$ E 52, which fact obviously implies, by the properties of A4 stated above, that 
Mkcp $ rj (of course, here j? is universally quantified). Entirely analogously, by using 
closure with respect o (xi), we get that M \A for each A E A. 0 
We will now state and prove a “canonical” version of Theorem 6.2 for the countable 
case, restricted to the Heyting structure (we are not able to handle the coHeyting 
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structure!). Let H be countable coherent category, with A a set of distributive objects 
in H. We seek a subcategory K of Mod 6Ko(H), the category of countable models of 
H such that the evaluation e:H + SetX is conservative, conditionally Heyting, 
and maps every A EA to a componentwise surjective functor. As it was pointed out 
after the statement of Theorem 6.2, necessarily, all objects of K have to be A-standard, 
and all arrows of K have to be A-surjective. The next theorem says that the maximal 
choice for K under the said restrictions works. 
Theorem 9.2. Let H be countable coherent category, with A a set of distributive objects 
in H. Let K = Mod” CHo(H) be the category of countable A-standard models of H, with 
arrows the A-surjective natural transformations. Then the evaluation e : H + SetK is 
conservative and conditionally Heyting. 
Proof. By Lemma 6.3 (with 1 = K,), e is conservative. According to (2.9, the Heyting 
character of e depends on the truth of the following statement: 
Given any f:X + Y, @E S(X) in H, ME K and YE M(Y) -V,-(Q),, there is 
h: M + N in K with x E M(X) - M(Q) and by(y) = (Mf)(x). (*) 
Assume the data and hypotheses in (*). As in the proof (in [29]) of Joyal’s theorem 
(3.4), h: M + N is sought as a model N = (N, h(c)),,,,, of the theory 
T = (L,,(M)u {x}, C), x:X, where 
Z d==r Z,uDiag+(M)u(f(x) = y}u{-r$j(x)). 
(T is, essentially, acoherent heory; e.g., 1 g(x) is the same as the coherent entailment 
e(x) + f; remember that x is a constant here!) 
The additional conditions are that (i) for each A E A, hA is a surjection, and (ii) N is 
A-standard. As to (i), to say that hA is surjective is equivalent o saying that N satisfies 
the infinitary entailment 
Turning to (ii), consider an instance of the A-standardness condition given by 
A E A, n: A x U + U a product projection in H, Y E S(A x U). To say that 
N(VnY) = VNn(NY) as subsets of NU is to say that, for u E NU, 
u E N(V*Y) o Va E NA. (a, u) E NY. 
Here, the left-to-right implication is automatic; thus, the implication from right to left 
is the required condition on N. Assume now that N is given with h : M + N such that 
h,: MA + NA is a surjection; this will certainly hold if N satisfies the AA above. 
Then, the quantifier “Va E NA” can be replaced by the quantifier “Va E MA”; more 
precisely, 
Va E NA. (a, U)E NY o Va E MA. (hAa, U)E NY. 
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For any given u E NU, the right-hand side here is the same as to say that we have 
rn\A aeMA fau. Therefore, the condition of N satisfying the given instance of A- 
standardness i that it satisfy the infinitary entailment 
(for the [ ] notation, see p. 48). We conclude that to prove (*), we need a model of 
T satisfying all the conditions ,4A and n(A,v,r) given above. 
We apply Proposition 9.1. T is consistent, by (the proof of) the Joyal theorem. Let 
us show that the infinitary entailments are locally consistent with T. We use the 
A-standardness of M in the form stated in the next lemma; here, A is an object in 
A, a:A; we abbreviate the theory (L,(M), ZHu Diag+M) as TM = (LM, CM). 
Lemma. 
aEMA, 
Thf 
Let rp(u, it), $(a, i3) be coherent formulas over LM, and assume that for all 
we have 
(equivalently, 
TM F c~(a,it)/\a = a 2 $(a,+)). (9.1’) 
Then 
and, as a consequence, 
(9.2) 
(9.3) 
Proof of Lemma. Assume the hypothesis. Consider the formula 
T(U) :=: [V’i;] (cp(u, i3) [ +]$(a, 6)). 
As a first step, we show that 
(M, c),,,~, != r(a) for all a E MA. (9.4) 
Fix a E MA for a moment. By compactness, there is 6 E Diag+ M such that in (9.1), 
Diag+ M can be replaced by 6. Let 2 be a tuple of elements of M including a and 
including those that appear in 6, q(a, i;) or $(a, 3). Choose a tuple I! of variables 
matching Z and disjoint from u and rt; let z in I! correspond to a in 2’. Let 
6(a, Z), cp(u, 3, t), $(a, it, 2) be L,,-formulas such that 6, cp(a, it) and $(a, iG) are ident- 
ical to the substitution instances S(Z), cp(u, is, Z), I&, ii, Z), resp. It follows that 
T, I- W) * z = 4 * da, &Z) z $(a, i?, z), 
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that is, 
We infer that 
and 
[uZ:GQ) A z = a] 6 v~([awZ:cp(a, 3, Z)] --) [awz:r&, G, Z)]), 
for x: [ai@] -+ [a?] the projection; and this is the same as 
Since Mb(@) A t = a) [a/a, T@], the assertion follows. 
Now, consider [Vu] t. From (9.4), and the fact that M is A-standard, we conclude 
that 
This says that [VU]T E Diag+M; (9.2) follows. Note that 
Eq. (9.3) follows. 
Note that for any coherent entailment 8 F v over LM u {x) (x@i), 
T t 8 7 v 0 TM i-f(X)=J’A% = vvg(x). Xii (9.5) 
Let us check that AA (A EA) is locally consistent with T. Let u’ contain u but not x 
(the latter from T ); let % T v be a coherent entailment over LM u {xl. Assume T k-8 A 
u = a T v for all a E M(A). By (9.5) 
TM t-~(X)=YA%AU=U z vvcJ(x) forallaEM(A). 
BY (9.3), 
TM I- f(x) = Y A 8 z v v g(x); 
and by (9.5) again, T l-8 2 v as desired. 
Next, we turn to the local consistency of A,,, u, a). Now, we have % 2 v , u E ii, ~$2, 
u@i, and as assumptions 
T I- 8 t vvY/au forallaEM(A), 
and 
T i- %A[vU]!&ZU 7 v. 
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That is, 
TM t- f(x)=yr\B s v v yuau v g(x) for all a E M(A) (9.6) 
(9.7) 
By (9.6) and the lemma, 
TM k [Vx~][Vu](f(r)=y~B[~]vv’Yauv~x). (9.8) 
Let c be the formula [Vu] (S(x) = y A d[ +]v v !fuu v f&r), and let 3 be all the 
M-constants in o. Then, by “intuitionistic logic” (‘v’u(P + Qu) E P + VuQa provided 
u is not free in P), 
[@kc] = [jkf(X)=yA~[+][tlU](VV@@.W~X)]; 
by the distributivity of A, 
c@J:cv I( Y u v v uu v CgJx)] = [ yxii: v v gx v [Vu] !fuu]; 
thus, 
[JM:o] = [JJxS:f(x) = y/Y @[+J v v 9x v [Vu] Yuu]. 
With (9.8), this implies 
TM l- f(X)=yA8 2 vvcpxv[vu]yuu, 
which, together with (9.7), gives by “coherent logic”, 
TM kf(X)=yAk’ z vvgx, 
that is, by (9.5) 
Tl-tl=SV, 
2 
as desired. D 
Theorem 9.2 is a generalization of Giirnemann’s [lo] completeness theorem on 
intuitionistic logic with the constant domains axiom. In fact, also the proof given here 
is a generalization of the original proof; see Chapter 3, Section 3 of [S]. Gbrnemann’s 
theorem was formulated for ordinary one-sorted logic; but the essential hypothesis on 
Hfor the original proof to go through without essential change is that every object of 
His a subobject of some A E A. Given this assumption, the proof of (*) reduces to the 
treatment of implication. We outline the argument, to provide a comparison with the 
proof of the general result, Theorem 9.2. The argument below is essentially the same as 
e.g. the proof of 3.3.2 in [S]. 
Assume the hypotheses and the notation of Theorem 9.2; assume, in addition, that 
His Heyting, and for every object X E H, there is a monomorphism X H A into some 
A E A. The fact that e is conservative is proved as before (6.3). To show that e is 
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Heyting, it suffices to show that e preserves V,, for every product projection 
n: A xX +X with A E A, and that e preserves the implication @ + Y, with 
@, Y E S(A), A E A; this follows from formula (3.2’) and the second additional hypoth- 
esis. However, the preservation of the Vz by e, with the said q is automatic. In fact, for 
M E K, and the projection eM: SetK -+ Set, M z e 0 eM, and M preserves VT (the 
definition of K); since the eM are jointly conservative, the assertion follows. 
It remains to show the preservation of the implications. Interestingly enough, in the 
proof we will have another use of the (second) additional assumption. 
We need to show 
Given A CA, @, Y E S(A), M E K, a E M(A) such that ao$M(@ + Y), there is 
h: M --) N E K (in particular, h A-surjective) such that h,(ao) E N(@)\N(Y). (w) 
It suffices to show that 
C zf &J Diag+UWu {Wd,l Y&J) 
has an L(M)-model whose L,-reduct is A-standard, and in which every element is the 
denotation of some L(M) constant; the latter ensures that the resulting h : M -+ N is 
A-surjective. 
Define (0, v) to be an approximation if 8, v are coherent L(M)-sentences, and for 
Co d==f C,u Diag+ (M), we have Co I+0 * v; there are no free variables in the 
entailment involved. We claim the following properties; (0, v) denotes an arbitrary 
approximation. 
(xi) (?(a&, !f(ao)) is an approximation. This is by a04 M(@ + Y) and (the proof of) 
Joyal’s theorem (3.4). 
(xii) If Cot-B * cp v +, then either (0 A cp, v) or (0 A II/, v) is an approximation. 
Immediate. 
(xiii) If ZOkv * rp A I(/, then either (0, v v cp) or (0, v v $) is an approximation. 
Immediate. 
(xiv) If A E A, u:A, and & I-Vaq(a) * v, then there is a E M(A) such that (0, v v q(a)) 
is an approximation. Otherwise, Cot-8 * v v q(a) for all a E M(A). This means 
that M* l=e[ --t ](v v q(a)) for all a E M(A), hence, by M being A-standard, M* k 
[Vu] (O[ -+]v v cp(u)) and M* k O[ -][V’a](v v q(a)); using that A is distribu- 
tive, we get M* k O[ +](vv [Vu]q(~)), i.e., M*Hl[ -+]v, hence, e[ -IV E 
Diag+(M), and C0F8 =z. v, contradiction. 
(xv) If A E A, u:A, and Co l-0 * 3 q(u), then there is a E M(A) such that (0 A q(a), v) 
is an approximation. Otherwise, Cot-8 A q(a) =z. v, that is, M* b 
q(a) [ + ](O[ + ] v) for all a E M(A); using that M is A-standard, we get as before 
that CWM4C -+ PC -+ 19 E Diag+W). But, intuitionistically, 
V+?(a) + 4V-(3 UP(N) + + is valid provided $ does not have u free; we 
conclude that M t(3oq(a))[ -]@I[ -Iv)), hence Z,t-8A3ucp(a) 3 V, and 
Co l-0 + v, contradiction. 
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(xv’) For arbitrary X E H, x:X, if C,, l-0 3 3x+), then there is x E M(X) such that 
(0 A q(x), v) is an approximation. This follows from (xv) since there is a mono- 
morphism m:X- A, with A E A. Writing @ = [m] E S(A), and e(a) for a 
formula for which &I-cp(x) y @(m(x)), we have that 
&I b 3x&x) 7 3@(a) A @(a)); 
applying (xv) to 3 a($+) A @(a)), we easily obtain the desired conclusion. 
(xvi) Like (x) above, for C,, in place of C in (x); immediate. 
Using (xi)-(xvi), by a construction such as the one in the proof of Proposition 9.1, 
we obtain a pair (0, Sz) of sets of L(M)-sentences, satisfying (i)-(iv) above, with 
% = the set of L(M)-constants, and such that Diag+(M) c 0, g(ao) E 0, !Y(a,) E s1, 
and such that, the L(M)-model N of 0 u (l)sZ satisfies ZH (use(xvi)), and finally such 
that IV is A-standard (use (xiv)). Then, N is a model of the above C, with the required 
additional properties. 
As mentioned above, we do not know whether Theorem 9.2 holds with “biHeyting” 
replacing “Heyting”. 
We have a result similar to Theorem 9.2 for modal logic. 
Theorem 9.3. With the assumptions of Theorem 6.6, and with H, D countable, and with 
K = Mod!,,,(H), J = Mod&,(D) ( see Theorem 9.2), the evaluation (eK, e.,) : t : H + D) + 
(SeP 2% SetJ) is conservative and conditionally S4. 
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 9.2; we omit the details. Again, we do not 
have the coS4 part of the picture. However, thanks to a proof given by Ghilardi and 
Meloni in [S], we do have the biS4 case of Theorem 9.3 for biS4 categories rather than 
pre-biS4 ones. 
Let (+ :HHD) E Coh, with $ conservative, D Boolean, and both H and D count- 
able; we may write . for I&; let A be a set of Barcan objects in H. Let K and J be as in 
Theorem 9.3; note that all models of H are k-standard, since D is Boolean. Thus, 1 JI is 
the discrete category of all countable models of D. Let L = J]K, the objects of L are 
the countable models of D; the arrows the H-homomorphisms between the H-reducts 
that are A-surjective. Consider 
(9.9) 
H- Set L 
eH 
as constructed, from K and J, in (3.21); e,, eH are, essentially, evaluations. Clearly, for 
all A E A, e,(A) is a componentwise surjective functor. Theorem 9.3 implies (just as 
(3.15’) implies (3.21)) that (9.9) is a conservative, conditionally S4 morphism. The 
following argument due to Ghilardi and Meloni [8], applied here in a somewhat more 
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general context, shows that 
(9.9) is conditionally coS4. (9.10) 
Let U E H, @ E S(o), o@ E S(U) exist, M E Mod&D), u E M(o@) c M(U); we 
want to construct N E Mod&D) with A-surjective h : N rH + M rH and 
ti E N(Q) c N(U) such that h,(G) = u. We construct N and h approximating them by 
finite pieces. Let !E,, be a countable set of individual constants as in the proof of OTT. 
An approximation is, by definition, a triple (V, f, cp) of a finite subset V of ?ZO, 
a function fwith domain a subset of V consisting of variables in I/ of sorts X for some 
X E H (such variables are called H-variables), and with range a subset of ) M 1, and of 
a formula cp over L, with free variables included in V such that the condition below 
holds. Let 3 be a repetition free tuple of the variables in dam(f);@ is the correspond- 
ing tuple of elements of M; 1 one that lists the remaining variables in V. Let X E H 
with X = [Z] and consider [3:32~] E S(X), 0[3:33~] E S(X). The condition on 
(V,f, cp) is that fx~ M(o[3:3Zq]). One is tempted to say Mko3fq[Z/@] for the 
same; this is correct as long as we imagine the subscript 3 attached to 0; 
M k w 3 Zcp [$?I. Implicit in the condition is that fmaps a variable to an element of the 
same sort as the variable. Let us denote the set of all approximations by &. 
With li E To, 6: ri fixed, the assumptions tells us that 
(xvii) ({a}, [ti HU], @) E d. 
(xviii) If(V,f,cp)EdandT,Fcp ,jrl/i~tC/~,then(V,1;cpA$,)~&fori= lori=2. 
This is because cp = (cp A +i) v (cp A 11/& hence, 03tcp = 03Z(cp A $1) v 
o 3 Z(q A $2) (with a slightly imprecise but suggestive notation). 
(xix) If (V, f, cp) E d and T&cp 7 3 z$ with t E ZO, z$ V, z not an H-variable, then 
(Vu{z},f,cpA~)E~.Becausecp~3z(cpA~),ando3Z~-o3~(~AII/). 
(xx) If(V,f,cp)E&andT,Fcp 7 3x$ with x E To, x$ I/,x an H-variable, then for 
asuitablex~lMJ,(Vu{x},f [ u x HX], cp A $) E d. Now, cp 3 3x((p A +), and 
02 33~~ = ojt 3 x3Z(cp A $) = 3x0s 3Z((p A tj); this is because the “Barcan for- 
mula for o and 3” is (automatically) true, expressing as it does the fact that 
preserves 3. Thus, the assumption (I’, f, q) E d gives us a witness x E 1 M ) for 
the leading existential quantifier 3x in the last formula; this x works as desired. 
(xxi) If (V, J cp) E d, A E A and a E M(A), then for any u E x,, such that a: k, a$ V, 
we have (Vu{,}, fu[a Ma], q) E d. This is because 023&p E O& 
32q, that is, o[3:3Z~] = oti*[&z:3Zr,~] = n*o[%z:3Zq], with rc:X x A +X the 
projection; this is the substitutivity of o along n, which is a consequence of the 
Barcan property of A. 
An approximation (V’,f’, cp’) extends another, (V,f, cp), if V c I/‘, f c f’ and 
T,t-cp’ 7 cp. Using (xvii)-(xxi), we can easily construct an w-type sequence of 
approximations (a, = (V,, fn, rp,)>, <w such that for m < n, a, extends a,,,, and such 
that the sequence is closed under the (possibly non-deterministic) losure conditions 
implicit in (xvii)-(xxi); call these facts (xvii)*-(xxi)*. Let CZ = un<, V,, 0 the set of 
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formulas 0 over LD u.% such that T,l--rp, “7 0 for some n < w. 0 is closed under 
logical consequence; it is consistent; if +i v rclz E 0, then $i E 0 for i = 1 or i = 2 (by 
(xviii)*); if 3 u+ E 0, then I& E 0 for a suitable u (by (xix)* and (xx)*). Also using that 
D is Boolean, it follows that (.!Z, 0) is a consistent and complete extension of T,, with 
a model (N, ji),,.$ all whose elements are denotations of constants in 3”. 
Let h: (N rH( + 1 M tH( be given by h(ii) = f.(u), with some (any) n < o such that 
u E dom(f.). It is easy to see that h is well-defined, and it respects orts. Fact (xv)* says 
that h is A-surjective. To see that h is an H-homomorphism, consider an object Y in H, 
!P E S(Y), and assumey’c N(Y) to show that hyy =fu E M(Y). Let n < w be a num- 
ber such that, with ( Vnn,fn, cp,) = (V, f, cp), y E V, and !& is a consequence of cp, 
T,t-rp 7 !&. Let us use the notation introduced when spelling out the condition for 
(V,f, cp) to be an approximation. It follows that TDl-3Zq F !J& hence, with 
@ = [Z:32~], and xc: X + Y the projection, @ <x ti*(@). It follows that 
O@ z& n*(Y). The fact that (V, f; cp) is an approximation gives fi E M(X); thus, 
jZ E M(n*(Y)), which is the same as ~JJ E M(Y) as desired. 
Fact (xvii)* amounts to saying that h,(ri) = u. The proof of (9.10) is complete. 
Theorem 9.3 and (9.10) give the following theorem. 
Theorem 9.4. Let Ic/ :H + D be a countable biS4 category, A a set of Barcan objects in 
H. Then the canonical map (9.9), with L the category of countable D-models with 
A-surjective H-homomorphisms, is a conservative biS4 morphism. 
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